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The purpose of this research was to examine recent legis-
lation mandating warranties in Defense Acquisition. The
examination comprised three discrete phases; 1) the definition
of Defense warranties and a comparison with standard commercial
warranties, 2) examination of several contextual relationships
affecting the acquisition environment, and 3) a review of
legislative developments occurring between the Spring of 1983
and the Summer of 1984.
As a result of this analysis it is concluded that the
issue of Defense warranties is more complex than initially
recognized by Congress, the life cycle cost implications of
Defense warranties are poorly defined, and the intent of the
initial warranty legislation was poorly conceived and con-
veyed. This study recommends that comprehensive examination
of Defense warranty cost behaviors and enforcement practices
be conducted in order to determine the most effective structures
to implement the requirements of the legislation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS




B FOCUS OF THE RESEARCH 8
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 9
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 9
E RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 9
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 10
G. LIMITATIONS 11
H. DEFINITIONS 11
I . ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 12
I
I
. THE WARRANTY 14
A. INTRODUCTION 14
B. IMPLIED WARRANTIES 14
C. EXPRESS WARRANTIES 15
1. General Concept 15
2 . Advantages to the Buyer 15
3. Difficulties in Warranty Management
for the Buyer 2
4. Difficulties in Warranty Management
for the Seller
. 26
D. BASIC WARRANTY COST ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS... 27
E. BASIC WARRANTY PROVISIONS 38
1 . Standard Commercial Type Warranty 38
2. The Reliability Improvement Warranty 40
3. The Mean Time Between Failure Warranty..... 4 2
4. The Mean Time to Repair Warranty 42
5. The Logistic Support Cost Commitment 43
6. The Warranting of Technical Data 43
F . SUMMARY 44
III. THE CONTEXT OF WARRANTY LEGISLATION 4 5
A. INTRODUCTION 4 5
B
.
THE CHRONOLOGY 4 5
C. LEGISLATED RISK MANAGEMENT 50
D. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
. 51
E. THE DEFENSE MARKETPLACE 56
F . SUMMARY 59
IV. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 60
A. INTRODUCTION
. 60
B. DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE LEGISLATION 60
C. THE FINAL LEGISLATION 66
D. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE 67
E. THE BATTLE IS ENGAGED 69
F. IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE PUBLISHED IN FEDERAL 70
REGISTER 70
G. THE FY85 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 77
H . SUMMARY 8
V. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 8 2
VI . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 91
A. CONCLUSIONS 91
6
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 9 3
C. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 95




LIST OF REFERENCES 113
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 117
I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The use of warranties in commercial transactions has be-
come commonplace to the point of being an implicit requirement
to the marketing of virtually every product or service in the
United States. In Defense acquisition, warranties have not
been received with such universal acceptance, either by con-
tractors or by the procuring agencies. The purpose of this
thesis is to analyze the development of warranty issues over
the last several years and to address the viability of the
blanket warranty requirement imposed by recent legislation on
all Defense weapon systems acquisitions.
B. FOCUS OF THE RESEARCH
The focus of the research for this thesis was two-fold.
First there was a necessity to develop some understanding of
the conceptual development of the warranty in American commerce
not only within the private sector, but also within the
Defense industry. The second direction of the research effort
was toward the recent developments in legislated warranty pro-
visions within Defense acquisition instruments. Why the issue
is perceived as a problem, the Congressional intent in solving
the problem, the Department of Defense actions taken in the
face of Congressional guidance, and the responses of acquisition
practitioners throughout the Defense Acquisition process are
3
all issues that have to be considered before any understanding
of how to employ warranties can be derived.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The discrete objectives of the research for this thesis,
then, can be categorized as follows:
1. develop a historical context
2. develop an analysis of warranty provisions and their
attendant costs and benefits
3. trace the current legislative history of warranty
provisions
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was:
How did the Department of Defense and the Defense industry
implement the requirement for the private sector to warrant
weapon systems as provided for in P.L. 98-212 and what are
the implications of this implementation?
Subsidiary research questions were:
1. What constitutes a warranty as defined by commercial law,
standard commercial practice, and P.L. 98-212?
2. How did the mandated requirement for warranties on DOD
weapon systems acquisitions evolve?
3. How have the various agencies within the Department of
Defense interpreted and responded to the requirement for
warranties?
4. What effect will the law mandating warranties have on the
cost of weapon systems acquisition?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The introduction to the topic, and the source of most of
the background data regarding types of warranties and their cost
implications, resulted from a comprehensive literature review.
It was only as the research unfolded that there began to de-
velop any sort of legislative history to the warranty provision.
The basic conception of the legislation was gleaned from an
interview with Mr. John H. Metzger of Senator Mark Andrews'
staff and from a speaking engagement before the National Con-
tract Management Association of Mr. Alan R. Yuspeh, a member
of the General Counsel, Committee on Armed Services of the
United States Senate. Pentagon and Industry perceptions and
implementations were garnered both through interviews with
various acquisition executives and through analysis of numerous
memoranda and pieces of correspondence.
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of the study is defined by what will not be
attempted. As the current warranty legislation is a direct
result of the Congressional oversight process, there is some
discussion of the relationship between Congress and the
Acquisition process. However, an in-depth analysis of the
Congressional oversight process is neither desired nor
attempted.
Warranty issues are strongly intertwined with a number of
cost and pricing issues. However, to fully develop the cost
models and probability concepts necessary to quantify such
costs in even one case, given that one could assume the plethora
of variables that would be required, is beyond the scope of this
study. Even a simple model dealing with the pricing of war-




[1] Additionally, such a level of detail is
unnecessary to understand the basic cost relationships of
warranties. Therefore, rather than develop discrete models, a
generic overview of contractual cost behaviors, both with and
without warranties, will be explored.
G. LIMITATIONS
It was only late in the research process that any sort of
even basic agreement as to how to proceed was reached between
Congress, DOD , and Industry. Due to the currency of the
problem, the long term effect of the legislation has not yet




For purposes of this study, the following definitions are
provided [2:634, 1423]:
1. Warranty - A warranty is a statement or representation
made by seller of goods, contemporaneously with and as a
part of (a) contract of sale, though collateral to ex-
press object of sale, having reference to character,
quality, or title of goods, and by which seller promises
or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall
be as he then represents them.
[It is] a written statement arising out of a sale to the
consumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the manu-
facturer, distributor, or retailer undertakes to preserve
or maintain the utility or performance of the consumer
good or provide compensation if there is a failure in
utility or performance; or in the event of any sample or
model, that the whole of the goods conforms to such
sample or model. [2:1423]
2. Guaranty - [A guaranty is] a collateral agreement for
performance of another's undertaking. [It is] an
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undertaking or promise that is collateral to primary
or principal obligation and that binds the guarantor in
the event of nonperformance by the principal obligor.
[It is] an undertaking by one person to be answerable
for ... the due performance of some contract or duty,
by another person, who himself remains liable to pay or
perform the same. [2:634]
'Guaranty' and 'warranty' are derived from the same root,
and are in fact etymologically the same word, the 'g' of
the Norman French being interchangeable with the English
'w' . They are often used colloquially and in commercial
transactions as having the same signification, as where
a piece of machinery or the produce of an estate is
'guarantied' for a term of years, 'warranted' being the
more appropriate term in such a case. [2:635]
On the part of the warrantor, and the contract is void
unless it is strictly and literally performed, while a
guaranty is a promise, entirely collateral to the
original contract, and not imposing any primary liability
on the guarantor, but binding him to be answerable for
the failure or fault of another. [1:635]
[This distinction notwithstanding, for the purposes of
this study the terms "warranty" and "guaranty" will be
assumed interchangeable unless otherwise specified.]
3. Weapon System - Although not codified until late in the
process of developing this study, the term "weapon
system" will be defined as it appears in the FY85 Defense
Authorization Act. Thus 'weapon system' means items that
can be used directly by the armed forces to carry out
combat missions and that cost more than $100,000 or for
which the eventual total procurement cost is more than
$10,000,000. Such term does not include commercial items
sold in substantial quantities to the general public.
[3:2403]
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II describes the basic concept and nature of some
basic commercial and Defense warranties including cost consid-
erations. Chapter III introduces several contextual concepts
for consideration in order to understand the recent legislative
history. Chapter IV outlines the current legislative
12
developments of warranties. Chapter V summarizes the data
presented, and the final chapter offers some conclusions and




Understanding the nature of warranties is integral to the
development of the current historic perspective of warranties.
Implied warranties will be introduced and express warranties
will be presented in terms of a general concept, basic manage-
ment considerations for both the buyer and seller, and basic
cost analysis considerations for the buyer and seller.
B. IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Implied warranties are "read into" contracts by common law,
even if the specific language is not addressed. [4:40] Typical
of classical implied warranties are: [4:41-45]
1. that the seller has title to the goods or will have when
title to the property is to pass,
2. that the buyer shall have the goods free from all claims
of other persons,
3. that the goods shall be free from encumberances except
those specifically stated,
4. where there is a sale by description or sample, the
goods shall comply with the description or the sample,
and if sale is by both, the goods must comply with both
and be of equal quality,
5. where the buyer makes known the particular purpose for
which the goods are to be used and relies on the seller's
skill and judgement, a warranty that they are reasonably
fit for such purpose is implied,
6. where the goods are bought by description from the seller
who deals in goods of that description, there is an im-
plied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable
quality, and
14
7. if the goods are sold for human consumption, it is





In a standard commercial warranty the seller warrants
that seller-designed systems, accessories, equipment, and
parts shall be free from defects in design, material, and work-
manship and shall conform to the detailed specification
requirements over some specified period of time. [2:1423]
Such a simplistic arrangement is seldom utilized in
weapon system warranties. For reasons which will be addressed,
there are numerous variant weapon system warranties, some
which mirror standard commercial practice and some which do not.
2
.
Advantages to the Buyer
The advantages to the customer of even a simple warranty
are that there is some indemnity against premature failure or
latent defect, and also that both the seller's and buyer's
attention to product reliability is maintained, thus highlight-
ing improving availability and operability. [5:355] The seller
is made to "stand behind his product." Although most manu-
-
facturers see the marketing necessity to maintaining a good -
reputation, in our increasingly litiguous society, an express
warranty makes the issue less an act of faith and more a legal
requirement
.
There are other benefits, however. The greatest apparent
benefit attending the inclusion of warranties in contractual
15
clauses is the strictly financial one. The warranty can pro-
vide for the repair or replacement of defective items or
components during the period of coverage. This can be either
prorated through the usable life remaining in the product, as
is typically the case in the enforcement of automobile tire
warranties, or it may be simply a "free" replacement or repair.
While there is always a cost associated with a warranty, in
the case where the buyer "picks up" a standard commercial war-
ranty at no nominal additional cost, the repair or replacement
is virtually free. [6:46.703d] Another financial benefit
which, although passed up by the Government through its policy
of "self - insurance" is the liability for follow-on or
"consequential" damages resulting from a warranted failure.
[7:4-H-95] Frequently, limited commercial warranties exclude
indemnity for consequential damages, but it remains a thorny
legal issue nontheless. [8:E-7]
There are a number of other benefits which accrue to
the Defense customer when warranties are applied. In the case
of military equipments, probably the most significant benefit
is the long term retention of the contractor's interest in the
equipments' life cycle cost. Rather than remaining ignorant to
the condition, reliability, maintainability, and field per-
formance, the seller will remain in contact with his equipment
for the period a warranty is in place, taking the opportunity
provided to evaluate, document, and improve its current or
future performance. [5:555]
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Another activity which will receive increased contractor
attention applies to the review of contract specifications for
design and performance as provided by the Government. When it
is a legal requirement for the contractor to warrant performance
at the level called for in the applicable standards, there will
be incentive provided for the contractor to review the technical
and performance requirements with a keener eye. [9:2]
Another positive aspect of the inclusion of warranties
is the potential for increased availability of a weapon sys-
tem simply because the interest of both the Government and the
contractor will be maintained in the equipments operability.
[9:2]
Configuration management could also be enhanced, depend-
ing upon the nature of the warranty provisions. [5:356] There
will be incentive for each equipment to begin the coverage
period in as good a shape as possible, there will be incentive
for the contractor to keep every equipment as up-to-date as
possible, and there will be incentive to track the individual
maintenance history of each component to verify causes of
failures. There will also be a desire on the part of the con-
tractor to keep each component in a standardized configuration
because it will minimize any contractor level trouble- shoot ing
or repair expenses if every component is identical. In
addition to keeping track of each component and providing
configuration management, a warrantor may find it cost efficient
to perform some periodic maintenance checks, such as annual
17
inspections or bench testing after so many operating hours.
The cost of planned maintenance actions is always less than
those associated with casualty maintenance. Planned
maintenance may be "gratis" like the thousand-mile check-up,
or it may be an express conditional cost of continued
warranty coverage. In either event, it simply incorporates
some discipline into the idea of maintaining the contractor's
attention
.
The final benefit comes to the Government in a variety
of costs avoided. The prime cost avoided in terms of material
support is in inventory costs. [10:8] Inventory volumes at the
organizational level will not be radically affected because of
the requirement to maintain insurance spares to support pre-
ventive and corrective maintenance actions. However, at the
wholesale level there will be considerable savings. Because
the contractor will provide the piece-parts support for inter-
mediate and depot-level maintenance. Those are parts that will
not have to be purchased, transported, stored, preserved,
maintained on stock records, inventoried and reinventoried
,
guarded, replaced when damaged or lost, issued, and accounted
for. [10:9]
Another savings comes in the training of technicians
to troubleshoot and maintain newly introduced and technologically
unique equipments. [10:10] Rather than having to provide po-
tentially expensive career-pipeline training for new technicians,
the Government can rely on the contractor for maintenance
during the introductory phase of the equipment life and can
then provide package training for technicians who are already
familiar with the equipment from on-the-job observation and
operation
.
While there might be savings in school seat require-
ments and the development costs of a new technical curriculum,
there are concomitant direct costs savings in terms of
technician manning, particularly for shipboard Intermediate
Maintenance Activities. [11:9] Manning aboard all ships is a
constant problem. There is not enough space on the ship to
put all the necessary talent, and the necessary talent is not
always available to go to sea. This is particularly true in
the case of technicians experienced in high- technology equip-
ments who either move into civilian industry or are retained in
the service by detailing them ashore. By supporting maintenance
tasks with a contractor effort through a warranty commitment,
scarce shipboard billets and man-hours are freed to work other
priorities
.
Another cost avoided in the maintenance world is in the
equipments required to perform necessary trouble- shoot ing and
maintenance. It is not uncommon for high-tech test equipment
to be, of itself, scarce, expensive, and hard to maintain or
replace. All the costs associated with the establishment and
maintenance of an appropriate field, intermediate, or depot
level repair capability are avoided as long as it remains the
contractor's responsibility.
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The last of the consumer's savings is not readily
realized, but is significant, nevertheless. One interviewee
suggested that as a result of the contractor bearing the cost
of any repair or rework effort directly out of corporate
profits, such a process is going to be made as cost-effective
as possible. The costs to the Government, when at a later
date maintenance costs are supported or fully borne, will then
be minimized.
3 . Advantages to the Seller
One of the distinct advantages to maintaining a warranty
for the seller is the limitation of liability regarding some
combination of covered failures or defects, time period, and
incidental costs incurred due to a failure. [8:8-10]
There are other benefits, as well. Initially there is
the aspect of "good will" involved when a company stands behind
a product in terms of its reliability. The customer is also
satisfied because of the apparent savings (which may or may not
be related to any actual savings) in the maintenance of the
equipment. All of this leads to an enhanced corporate or
product image.
A warranty program provides a huge cadre of quality
inspectors with no vested interest in the future of the company
and no fear of being outspoken regarding design or production
defects - the customers. [12]
Corporate profits are tied directly to the minimization
of any warranty related costs, providing a very definite and
20
direct economic benefit. Another layer of profit may be
gleaned by the contractor when the warranty calls for pedi-
greed repair or maintenance support. In discussions with
contractors, most claimed to be unwilling to warrant an
equipment that has been repaired with off-standard components
which may affect performance. The similar practice of
requiring expensive periodic preventive maintenance checks by
the dealer is common with automobile warranties.
Another potential benefit is that the Government
learns to rely on the technical capability and experience of
the contractor. [5:358] When the warranty expires, that ex-
pertise can become very expensive, but because the Government
may not have built in its own technical capability, the
opportunity cost to forego contractor support may be excessive.
A corollary to the reliance on the contractor for
specific follow-on support is the general reliance on the con-
tractor as a capable and responsible entity. This provides an
edge for that contractor in future negotiations. Emphasis
frequently is placed on the proven provider as compared to
the cheaper yet technologically similar newcomer.
4
.
Difficulties in Warranty Management for the Buyer
While warranties can be a useful adjunct to the
acquisition, operation, and maintenance of an equipment, they
are certainly not a panacea without any problems.
The administration and enforcement of warranty provisions
is addressed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) as an
21
issue in the process of determining the suitability of a
warranty for a specific acquisition: [6:46,703]
There must be some assurance that an adequate system
for reporting deficiencies exists or can be established. The
adequacy of a reporting system may depend upon such factors
as the
1. nature and complexity of the item,
2. location and proposed use of the item,
3. storage time for the item,
4. distance of the using activity from the source of the
item,
5. difficulty of establishing the existence of deficiencies;
and
6. difficulty in tracing responsibility for deficiencies.
The issue of enforcing warranties was clearly documented
in a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) study relating to
warranties. [13:1-7] In a review of waste water treatment
facilities supported by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) , the study found the enforcement of warranties to be
lacking. Because there was no formal procedure for warranty
application, it was not unusual for EPA facilities to bear
costs properly chargeable to contractors' warranties. Personnel
were inadequately indoctrinated in the appropriate procedure to
follow when a warranted equipment required maintenance. Docu-
mentation regarding which equipments had warranties in force
was poorly maintained. Warranties were allowed to expire on
long lead time equipment purchased in advance before those
22
equipments were even operated. Contractors were allowed ex-
cessive time periods to correct warranted deficiencies. In
one case, the contractor took sixteen months to repair a
generator. In some cases EPA, in a desire to expedite a
repair, paid for potentially warranted repairs rather than
go through the administrative process of holding the con-
tractor accountable for timely relief. [13:1-7]
In another study, conducted in 1975, GAO examined
the failure of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
General Services Administration (GSA) to obtain the full
benefit of available truck warranties. [17: ii] In addition
to addressing the development of more advantageous warranty
terms (similar to commercial terms), aggressively pursuing
billbacks, and improving management surveillance, it was
evident throughout the report that there was no consistent
understanding by the users regarding what components were
warranted and when.
Another common problem with warranties is that the
field level technician may knowingly or unwittingly invalidate
warranty coverage. The basic operation and maintenance manual
relating to a major complex equipment installed in a large
number of Navy ships explicitly tasks the technician with
attempting to repair (thus invalidating) warranted components
in the name of technician training.
A more common problem concerning the enforcement of
warranty claims can be illustrated by the experience at a
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major military public works center. [14] A lot of cast
spigots was received for subsequent installation in various
plumbing applications. It was soon determined that about
half of the spigots leaked excessively through the casting
upon installation. Because the spigots were small and
relatively inexpensive, it was significantly easier for the
plumber to simply take a number of spigots to each installa-
tion site, find a good one by trial and error, and discard
the unusable albeit warranted castings.
Another problem for the consumer, balancing a potential
advantage enjoyed by the contractor, revolves around the pre-
viously discussed requirement for pedigreed parts. Such a
requirement would appear contrary to the current revitalized
interest in the concept of reducing the costs of repairable
and consumable parts acquired for replenishment. Under the
concept of breakout, emphasis is placed on the purchase of
such parts from contractors other than the prime weapon
system contractor. The competition and improvement to the
industrial and mobilization base fostered by such action
could well be negated by a requirement to purchase repair
parts for warranted equipments from the prime contractor.
[15:S6-102]
A problem with great potential to disrupt the flow of
resources in a wartime environment surrounds the capability of
a contractor to simultaneously support both a production and
a repair/rework capability. [16] In such a situation, to
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which small businesses are particularly susceptible, a con-
tractor's resource constraint may not be an issue unless there
is some substantial and unforeseen repair requirement. In
such a case, the contractor may be hampered by the physical
capacity of his plant and equipment, there could be a lack of
qualified technicians to support an increased labor force, or
the raw materials or subcontracted parts may be unavailable.
In any event, the ability to simultaneously support a combat-
level production and rework capability could suffer. [16]
While it was noted in a previous section that one of
the advantages to installing a warranty is the minimized re-
quirement for field-level technicians, there is an obvious
deficiency inherent in such an organic drawdown. Not only is
there the risk that, when deployed to a hostile environment,
critical equipments will be out of commission lacking tech-
nicians trained in casualty maintenance, but at a more basic
level, there may not even be the requisite trouble- shooting
capability to identify required repairs and relate them to a
specific warranty. [11:15]
Although a basic benefit to the concept of warranties
is a general improvement in reliability and subsequently an
increase in operational availability, whenever there is a
requirement to repair a defective component, it normally must
be transshipped to the contractor's facility. Such movement
not only reduces the operational availability of the component,
but adds to the cost of the program for both the user and the
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contractor. [1:21] The added cost becomes even more frus-
trating when, upon receipt of the alleged defective equipment
at the contractor's plant, there is found to be no deficiency.
[11:15]
5 . Difficulties in Warranty Administration for the Seller
There are drawbacks to warranties for the seller as
well. The contractor is faced with two basic categories of
difficulties imposed by warranties. The first is strict cost
assumption, and it is the easier of the two to quantify and
negotiate. As an implicit requirement of the warranty, the
contractor will have to maintain a stringent quality assurance
program which may involve a broader set of expenditures than
would be required without a warranty.
The greater of the two problems for the contractor,
and obviously more difficult to put a dollar figure on, is the
concept of risk assumption. In a direct sense, there is a
risk to corporate profits when a component is warranted.
However, there are other subtle risks with which the contractor
is faced. For instance, the contractor is not only gambling
that there will be a continuing supply of technical expertise
and plant capacity to support simultaneous production and
repair, but also is betting that the opportunity costs of
maintaining such a capability will not eclipse any potential
profit lost because of an inability to shift production assets
to a new product line. [11:17]
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Another facet of this risk beginning to receive at-
tention is in the management of subcontractors by the prime .
contractor including increasingly more complex indemnification
clauses in lower tier contracts. While warranty costs could
become the shared responsibility of the prime and any subcon-
tractors, implicit in the warranty is that any subcontractors
will continue to remain in business and support the product.
D. BASIC WARRANTY COST ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
While it is recognized that there are philosophical and
legal implications to the inclusion of express warranties in
acquisition instruments, there are also complex cost implic-
implications
.
A comprehensive Government warranty cost analysis model
reviewed by the researcher is one developed by ARINC Inc. for
the Rome Air Development Center. [17] It is the opinion of
the researcher that, while cost models are useful for some
aspects of cost analysis, most embody two basic generic de-
ficiencies. The primary problem is that they are algorithmic
in nature and, in order to be useful, must be utilized in a
mathematic environment where every variable in the model re-
quires the assignment of a discrete value. Such models can
become cumberson and confusing for the average consumer. The
other problem is that any such model is incapable of providing
a side-by-side comparison of costs (with and without a warranty)




A. NUMBER OF UNITS PURCHASED
1. OPERATIONAL UNITS / . ' / -
2. MINIMUM NUMBER OF SPARES
a. INITIAL SPARES » - - «•
b. REPLENISHMENT SPARES - - .
B. PURCHASE PRICE PER UNIT / =? / =
C. NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL UNITS
1. OPERATING HOURS PER MONTH PER UNIT / * I -
2. EOUIPMENT LIFETIME / * I -
3. WARRANTY PERIOD
a. GRACE PERIOD -
b. LENGTH OF COVERAGE [YEARS OR OPERATING HOURSJ * * / /
c. START TIME FOR TIME-PHASED INTRODUCTIONS - / /
D. COST OF MODIFICATION * -
E. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE COST <? » -
F. DIRECT COST PER FAILURE
1. AVERAGE LABOR HOURS PER FAILURE -
2. AVERAGE LABOR RATE PER FAILURE - = =
3. AVERAGE SHIPPING COSTS PER FAILURE -
4. AVERAGE MATERIAL COSTS PER FAILURE -
G. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT COSTS
1. INITIAL SUPPORT COSTS
a. TEST EQUIPMENT * - - *
b. TRAINING » ? ?
c. DATA / - / -
2. RECURRING SUPPORT COSTS
a. MAINTENANCE HISTORY RECORDS - -
H. RISK FACTOR
1. INCREMENTAL RISK BURDEN
a. TECHNOLOGICAL OUALITY - -
b. CONTINUING DESIRE / CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT MAINTENANCE -
2. CONTRACTOR FEE / / -
I. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT COSTS - -
J. OTHER
1. WARRANTY ADMINISTRATION COSTS
a. TESTING * - -
b. COVERAGE RECORDS * - -
c. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS * - -
d. COST OF OPERATIONAL TIME LOST / / -
e. REPORTING SYSTEM - -
f. TRAINING RE: WARRANTY SYSTEMS - -
2. WARRANTY PRICE / /
3. CONFIGURATION CONTROL * -
4. LOSS OF SPARES "BREAK-OUT" CAPABILITY - -
5. LOSS OF ORGANIC MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY / / -
6. PROGRAM COSTS *
LEGEND
NO CHANGE NO COST / NOT APPLICABLE
HIGHER COST - LOWER COST ? INDETERMINATE
Figure 1. Simplified Warranty Cost Analysis
Figure 1 provides a simplified accounting of the basic
costs occuring in warranty analysis along with a legend com-
paring cost behaviors for both the Government ("G") and the
contractor ("K") where there is a warranty in place ("WITH")
and where there is not ("W/0").
The first of the cost elements is the number of units
purchased. Components of this number are the number of
operational units required, but also the number of direct
replacement spares that are expected to be required to main-
tain some specific level of equipment availability. The
spares requirement consists of some basic minimum level re-
quirement (insurance spares) plus the level of spares expected
to be required over the life of the equipment (replenishment
spares). If the responsibility for providing spares coverage
becomes a responsibility of the contractor due to a warranty
provision, the costs of providing the spares will also shift.
When analyzing purchase price, an assumption in this model
is that the costs of warranty provisions are not reflected as
a direct element of the purchase price. As a practical matter,
there is no assurance, per se, that some cost of the warranty
won't be applied to the purchase price. This is particularly
true in a cost reimbursement type contract. While validating
other non-related cost elements will help to avoid padding to
pay for a warranty, finding such increases are extremely
difficult. [18]
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The next component of cost comparison is associated with
the number of operational units. There are two assumptions
implicit within this segment. First, that there is a
definitive cost applicable to owning and operating a piece of
equipment over some finite period and, second, that a war-
ranty provision will extend this finite operational life of an
equipment. Considering these assumptions, then, when a war-
ranty is applied, operating costs will rise concomitant with
operational availability. The length of the warranty coverage
period itself will modify these costs.
Direct costs of modification will be greater for the party
responsible for the bulk of the reliability improvements. [10:5]
One potential twist to the issue of modifications which needs
to be recognized, however, is that in the situation where there
are dual sources, the primary source may be able to accomplish
a change with little or no cost impact, while a competitor
secondary source established through some provision for data
rights may experience (and claim) greater costs in the imple-
mentation of the same change. [19]
That situation aside, the trading of cost responsibilities
in the case of modifications will still not necessarily be
linear. A contractor will tend to apply most attention to the
front end of the warranty, where there is some assurance of
payback before the warranty period expires. [5:359] On the
other hand, where the owner acts as a self -warrantor , the
researcher has found that the inclination would be to apply
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modification and improvement efforts and costs uniformly to
maintain maximum reliability over the life of the equipment
rather than over the life of the warranty. As a sidelight,
the costs of modifications to equipments normally increase
with age. As equipments get older, they tend to be relatively
less capable and therefore need more "help" to remain com-
petitive in their current technological environment. The net
result is that there will be some difference with a warranty,
but its definition is not as clear as in the case of some other
costs. [10:5]
It appears to the researcher that the cost of preventive
maintenance changes with a warranty. A precondition of many
warranties is that the unit in question must remain sealed to
avoid warranty invalidation, or at least that maintenance pro-
cedures are strictly controlled. One reason for this requirement
is to avoid any consequential internal damage by a heavy-handed,
untrained, or inexperienced technician. The implication is
that preventive maintenance will be minimized or at least
relatively simplistic in order to avoid compromising the
integrity of the warranted equipment. In the case of an unwar-
ranted equipment, a full preventive maintenance effort will be
undertaken in order to maximize reliability and operational
availability. For the Navy, this is a sizable centralized data
and material management system with far-ranging cost implica-
tions. Again, the reverse condition is not true for the
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contractor. Where the contractor is not supporting a
warranty, the preventive maintenance costs are essentially
zero. These costs would be limited to whatever preservation
effort must be applied in the period between manufacture and
delivery to maintain the full operational capability of the
equipment and the level of specification called for in the
contract. However, where there is a full warranty in place,
it may be desirable to have some capacity for the contractor
to provide routine inspection and preventive maintenance
checks. Such a situation would be beneficial for the Govern-
ment, obviously, but it may be beneficial for the contractor
as well. A routine inspection program could minimize false
pulls (fully operational equipments returned in error for
corrective maintenance) or could reveal weaknesses which, when
corrected, could potentially improve performance when some
measure of reliability is being warranted, in turn increasing
profits. So, while there is certainly a variance in costs for
the Government when a warranty is in place, there is only a
probability of cost increases for the contractor which would
be contingent upon his planned level of effort.
A cost which would seem constant throughout the analysis,
but which in fact varies greatly from one situation to the
next, is associated with the direct costs per equipment failure
There are four basic components commonly attributed to direct
failure cost: [1:17]
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1. average labor hours per failure,
2. average labor rate per failure,
3. average shipping costs per failure, and
4. average material costs per failure.
Without a warranty, the contractor will incur virtually
no labor hours, unless one counts any engineering effort spent
"gratuitously" analyzing the failure in terms of a potential
modification. All the costs for repair will be expended by
the Government. There are some variations when a warranty is
in place, however. There will be a shift in maintenance labor
hours from the Government to the contractor. The shift will
not be total because there is still some customer time invested
at the organic level in trouble-shooting to validate the failure
and preparing the equipment for contractor availability. Com-
mercial labor costs are relatively fluid when compared to the
Governments labor rates which remain generally constant as a
function of both wage rates and staffing in the military and
civilian federal service. [20] However, it appears to the re-
searcher that the average labor rate for a contractor's warranty
technicians should go down. No longer is the failure an iso-
lated case being evaluated by a sophisticated engineering team.
Rather, although the contractor would argue that top talent is
still required, an efficient contractor would hire a squad of
less highly trained technicians to effect repairs with a mini-
mum impact on the production line or the R$D staff. [18] The
average shipping cost per failure, defined as any cost directly
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involved in either packing and transporting the affected unit
to the maintenance facility or in transporting the appropriate
maintenance capability to the site of the failure, will be
higher whenever such transportation takes place over a
greater distance to some remote location. While there is a
potential that a contractor's maintenance facility could be
closer than the Government's, in the vast majority of cases
(owing to deployed equipments and organizational level
maintenance capabilities) the Government maintenance operation
will be closer.
The last component of direct failure costs is material
costs. Logic dictates that the total material costs will be
greater for the party charged with administering the warranty
and accomplishing any required repairs. It is the researcher's
experience that average material costs are dependent upon the
predictive capacity and accuracy of applicable inventory sys-
tems and therefore it would be difficult to predict a corre-
sponding discrete cost value. However, even where the repair
is the responsibility of the other party, some level of
inventory investment will be required as insurance items with
all the concomintant inventory carrying costs, thus developing
a minimum average material cost in either situation.
The next category of investment is in costs defined as
"maintenance support". The concept of initial maintenance
support costs contains three categories, any one of which
severely compounds the complexity of the cost analysis. While
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the requirement for test equipment seems benign, with the
greater cost going to the party responsible for maintenance,
there is still the added requirement for some level of support
for a contractor's engineering or R§D staff, and there remains
some requirement for some organic emergent maintenance capability
for deployed customers. Exactly at what level such costs are
appropriately charged to a warranty cost breakdown would cer-
tainly be open to negotiation. The costs associated with
training maintenance personnel are as difficult to define. It
again becomes a question of where to draw the line in allocating
costs, and there is no clear definition.
Recurring maintenance support costs, in particular the
documentation of maintenance history, becomes an issue as a
greater number of complex equipments are warranted and as the
costs associated with converting manual contractor or Govern-
ment maintenance records to integrated automated data files
increase. For both the Government and the contractor, imple-
mentation of a warranty and increasing the number of equipments
which must be controlled and administered increases the magni-
tude of these costs.
Quantifying the desire on the part of either the Government
or a contractor to maintain some level of technological quality,
while difficult, is attendant with the analysis of any warranty
which ties itself to reliability and is therefore something
with which one must deal. There should be more emphasis
placed on the quality of the product by the entity responsible
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for warranting the performance. As difficult as it may be to
measure the cost of this continuing interest, it is even more
difficult to measure the potential for maintaining a desire
and capability to support a continuing maintenance program.
The contractor is gambling the use of his facilities and
productivity against the probability of a more lucrative project
that would compete for the same capacity.
An immense cost that threads itself throughout discussion
of any process involving material stored in any fashion for
some future use is that of inventory management. [31:10] Costs
here could be broken down into either personnel/program manage-
ment costs or hardware/facilities costs, and could be treated
as either overhead costs or as direct costs. Regardless of
their treatment, it should be clear that they will depend on
the magnitude of the line items treated as a percentage in-
crease in already existing capacity and capability. There is
a significant difference between adding 200 line items to the
company with an in-house inventory of 20,000 line items as
compared to the company managing 2,000 line items.
The last category of warranty costs is the insipid "other"
category (not necessarily trivial, just "other"). First in
this list are the kinds of warranty administration costs not
treated elsewhere:
- testing by both the contractor and the Government to deter-
mine warranty compliance
- various records keeping requirements
36
- the inevitable increase in legal costs associated with
manipulating warranty provisions and enforcing warranty
claims
- the costs incurred by the operational entity resulting
from sending an equipment away for warranty work that
nominally would be repaired at the organizational level
much more quickly
- training in warranty administration at all levels within
the Government and many different levels within a con-
tractor's operation.
These categories all represent definable costs which lead
directly from the requirement to administer a wider variety
and larger number of warranty provisions.
In addition, as discussed earlier, the firm fixed price
of the warranty provision itself needs an accounting classifi-
cation, and "other" is the easiest and most logical to employ.
Configuration control, not the maintenance aspect, but
rather tracking the exact technological configuration of each
unit, could be considered by some as a maintenance support cost
However, the concept of maintaining a stable and consistent
population of equipments is so critical to the proper applica-
tion of any planned maintenance/reliability warranty program
that it is an issue which should be treated separately.
The next two costs are "loss" costs from generating an
inability to support the most efficient management systems.
On the one hand there could be spare parts purchasing inef-
ficiencies when pedigreed warranty requirements preclude break-
out. Secondly, there may develop atrophy of any organic and
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combat mission oriented maintenance capability. Both are al-
most impossible to quantify, but should at least be recognized
as real costs.
The last of the "other" costs are program costs, again
difficult to allocate to a specific project perhaps, but ex-
tremely important in recognizing the overall expense involved
in managing warranties within the Department of Defense.
Probably the best instance of this kind of expense is the Air
Force Product Performance Assurance Center at Wright -Patterson
Air Force Base. Such a concept is a sizeable undertaking af-
fecting the performance of contracts and contractors within
DOD and requiring some concept of allocation.
E. BASIC WARRANTY PROVISIONS
1 . Standard Commercial Type Warranty
Figure 2 provides a copy of a typical express commer-
cial machinery warranty. This particular warranty provides a
statement of:
1. the products to which the warranty does and does not
apply,
2. the type of defect covered,
3. the period of coverage,
4. the remedy available to the customer in the event of a
failure or defect, and
5. limitations to the seller's potential liability.
While there is an unlimited variety of such express




type of codification of the protections for both the buyer and
the seller that had previously been assured through implied
warrant ies
.
2 . The Reliability Improvement Warranty
One widely used warranty in equipment related contracts
was introduced into Navy acquisition by the aircraft avionics
industry as the "failure- free warranty", subsequently known as
the "reliability improvement warranty (RIW)." [5:335]
RIW relates to the concept of life cycle costing. The
general theory of life cycle costing is to reduce the cost of
owning and operating a particular piece of equipment over its
entire life, rather than simply focusing on initial acquisition
cost or maintenance costs alone. The reliability improvement
warranty is a basic provision of an acquisition instrument,
logically limited to Fixed-Price type contracts with a long
term delivery schedule, which serves to maintain the interest
of the seller in the continuous improvement of the field per-
formance and reliability of equipment. [5:336]
As the terms of the contract are defined, either dur-
ing the acquisition planning phase when invitations for bid or
requests for proposals are developed or, more likely, during
negotiations with offerors, a schedule of required performance/
reliability threshholds which increase over the life of the
equipment is developed and included in the contract costing and
performance analysis.
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As an example, the first Navy experience with a RIW
proposed to improve the mean time between failure (MTBF) for
800 A4/F4 Two-Gyro Inertial Platforms. [5:336] A thirty per-
cent improvement was to have been obtained in three phases of
twenty months each. Although there was some question of
whether the improvement was related to a pre- induct ion over-
haul to "initialize" each covered unit into the program, the
overall result was undeniable - a dramatic improvement in
readiness . [5:336]
The advantage to the customer of this type of warranty
coverage is that it provides significant incentive for the con-
tractor to continuously improve the reliability or performance
of an equipment over the life of a contract. Rather than re-
maining ignorant of the condition, reliability, maintainability,
and field performance of his equipment, the seller will remain
in contact during the period the RIW is in place taking the
opportunity to evaluate, document, and improve its performance.
The outfall of this effort is generally lower life cycle costs.
Additionally, provided design change retrofit records are proper-
ly maintained, there is the potential for a more reliable
standardized configuration at the point of maintenance assumption
by the Government. [5:338]
The contractor can benefit from a RIW because of the in-
creased profit potential. The contractor may also develop a
competitive advantage in securing follow-on contracts. Improved
design and production techniques, closer control of the design
41
as production continues, and increased understanding of the
unit in its operational mode all combine in the favor of a
current producer. There is also some potential for gaming of
RIWs which can lead a contractor to understate the initial MTBF




The Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) Warranty
There are other reliability and maintainability cost
reduction incentive warranties less complicated to administer.
One of these is the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) Warranty.
[21:XV-16] In this scenario, the contractor guarantees that
his equipment will reach and maintain some agreed upon MTBF.
Without the "sliding scale" provision inherent in a RIW, this
type of warranty demands not only a clear understanding of the
inherent reliability of the equipment before the warranty can
be negotiated, but also requires peak reliability with the first
unit delivered. This in turn will tend to drive up the cost of
the warranty. [21-XV-16] MTBF criteria are frequently structured
into RIW warranties in commercial airline acquisition programs,
but the absence of field troubleshooting and battlefield main-
tenance requirements make repair management by the contractor
significantly easier. [21: XV- 3]
4 The Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) Warranty
An Equipment Turnaround Time Warranty, also known as a
Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) Warranty, is one of the no-fault
clauses which serves no purpose in the establishment of
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performance liability but rather merely establishes a require-
ment for the contractor to perform necessary repairs to return
a defective or damaged unit to operational condition within a
certain time period. [21:XV-19] Although not as sophisticated
as some warranty provisions, it is certainly not trivial.
where expensive depot-level reparables- are frequently returned
for refurbishment and their replacement from inventory is an




The Logistics Support Cost Commitment
This warranty version is a contractual device designed
to achieve a target logistic support cost goal. It contrasts
with the reliability improvement warranty in that maintenance
remains the responsibility of the Government. Additionally,
there may be award fees for underruns and penalties for over-
runs, both structured on some limited cost sharing basis.
6 The Warranting of Technical Data
The warranting of technical data has received renewed
emphasis within the Department of Defense in an effort to as-
sure the usability of data acquired in the process of technology
transfer in developing secondary production sources of propri-
etary equipments. [22] Current procedures call for a warranty
coverage period of three years, longer than most equipment
warranties, during which the provider will correct or replace
at no cost to the Government, any data not conforming- to the




Although standard commercial warranties appear rather mun-
dane to the layman, the use of warranties in Defense acquisition
implies a variety of issues. There is the concept of using
a warranty as a quality assurance device in addition to its
commonly accepted role regarding producer liability. There are
widespread cost implications not normally considered in com-
mercial applications. Lastly, there is a wide variety of types
and combainat ions of warranties, only a few of which have been
discussed. Reviewing these concepts, however, is not enough
to fully understand the impact of the recent warranty legis-
lation. The next chapter provides some historic background
upon which the current machinations are based.
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Ill . THE CONTEXT OF WARRANTY LEGISLATION
A. INTRODUCTION
There are some historic and economic contextual considera-
tions which put the impact of the warranty legislation into
perspective. The first of the background considerations is the
historic evolution of the warranty, followed by a brief review
of another attempt at regulated risk management - the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) . This will
precede a brief description of the development of the current
Congressional oversight process. The final context considered
is the economic background within the Defense Industry and the
Defense acquisition system operate.
B. THE CHRONOLOGY
In 1965, Ralph Nader authored a best-selling book entitled
Unsafe At Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of the American
Automobile
,
chronicling glaring deficiencies in the design and
production of a sequence of American compact cars, the Chevrolet
Corvair. [23] In doing so, he reversed the old "Caveat Emptor"
("buyer beware") adage and introduced Americans to the philosophy
that manufacturers have a moral and legal responsibility to
produce a product which meets the explicit and implicit
expectations of the consumer market.
Nader became a media hero, and his efforts spawned numerous
"public interest action groups" acting as consumer advocate
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watchdogs to delineate and protect the rights of individuals
in the marketplace.
A by-product of the increased awareness of the producers'
and consumers' various rights and responsibilities has been a
heightened interest in the warranty as a legal instrument for
clearly establishing and enforcing quality standards.
As American business practices have moved increasingly
over the last two decades toward litigation to resolve buyer/
seller conflict, so has the perception that implied warranties
are insufficient to properly define and limit the rights and
responsibilities attending a sale. [11:2] The major difference
(excepting the variance in prices) between the Sears mail-order
catalog of 1893 and the Sears catalog of 1983 is that the latter
contains six pages of fine-print express warranties covering
a wide range of consumer goods for sale. [24:647-652] In
addition, there is a provision to have the company mail a copy
of any applicable warranties for review by the consumer prior
to the sale. Almost without exception, these warranties pro-
vide for some limited period of time during which Sears or the
appropriate manufacturer will correct any defects in workman-
ship or materials free of charge.
This same type of warranty coverage is available today for
almost any consumer good purchased in America. The result is
that the warranty has seen a widespread increase in popularity
as a term insurance policy on the things we buy offering in-
demnification against premature failures.
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Although not new in either commercial or defense applica-
tions, warranties were introduced in earnest into Defense
procurement in the late 1960's as a fallout from their use as
a marketing device by American manufacturers of commercial
airframes and avionics. [5:335] The use of warranties in-
creased, both in terms of their application to complex weapon
systems acquisitions, but also as warranties appeared more
frequently attached to simple commercial items purchased off
the shelf.
Over the last decade there have appeared several GAO
studies regarding warranties, primarily concerning commercial-
type vehicles. While there was concern regarding warranty
administration by the Department of Energy in 1979, the policy
considerations of the subject were not the focus of any real
attention until the acquisition of the Alternate Fighter Jet
Engine acquisition which began in 1980. [25:A-1]
As a pre-emptive competitive strategy described by one
interviewee, United Technologies, parent of Pratt and Whitney
Aircraft, one of the offerors in the engine competition,
offered a very attractive warranty as a portion of their pro-
posal. Although previously warranties were not considered of
paramount importance in the source selection process, the
visibility of the issue was raised primarily through the efforts
of Senator Mark Andrews of North Dakota. The result was that
with the increased emphasis on warranties and their perceived
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effect on life cycle costs, Pratt and Whitney beat out their
competition, General Electric, to take the award.
The inclusion of warranty provisions has become so common
that it is an accepted requirement for the successful market-
ing of almost any product or service. Although the commercial
application of warranties as a liability limitation device has
been relatively well understood, it took Lee Iacocca, Chief
Executive Officer at the ailing Chrysler Corporation, to see
the warranty as something even greater. As a part of his re-
covery program, Chrysler instituted the Five Year/Fifty
Thousand Mile Warranty. This critical part of Iacocca' s high
stakes gamble was described to the researcher by a former
Chrysler employee familiar with the decision. Combined with
Iacocca' s guaranteed loan and a massive advertising campaign
based on his personal charismatic appeal, the new warranty
program served to do two things. First, and most fortunate for
the American automobile industry, it sold Chryslers and saved
the company. Iacocca recognized two salient characteristics
about an automobile warranty; that the cost of honoring war-
ranties is deferred, and that they need only be honored for the
original owner. The second, and major effect of the five year
arranty was that it drove the automobile industry into a
rranty marketing competition. The necessity of providing a




every American product or service. The recognition of this
aspect of marketing management, has elevated "risk management"
to the level of a credible operant business management
philosophy
.
The concept of corporate property and liability insurance
coverage has changed from underwriting specific hazards to
"all risk" coverages with exclusion clauses in the case of
war, nuclear disaster, and so. There is now even "business
interruption" insurance. In the event of some catastrophic
event precluding the continuation of normal business activities,
business interruption insurance serves to: 1) maintain the
supply of products or services, 2) pay to retain key people,
3) satisfy creditors, and 4) in general accept much of the
basic "risk of doing business." [26:54] Liability insurance
has become a major expense for almost any commercial undertaking
Doctors and dentists have enormous liability coverages as do
transportation companies and their equipment suppliers. A
relatively new twist to liability coverage, however, is "retro-
active liability insurance". This coverage will raise the
limits of previous coverage, bringing them up to current um-
brella limits. [26:57] Another recent consideration is the
pooling of liability exposures, a technique frequently used
in Europe and only recently gaining acceptance in America.
Generally a consideration for Government entities, pooling
increases the exposure base so that losses are more predict-
able and the uncertainty of risk can be reduced. [26:58]
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The legal profession, historically concerned with provid-
ing appropriate risk averse guidance to clients, has found it-
itself faced with an increasing magnitude of legal issues that
effect the liability of companies previously considered "safe"
from such litigation. [8:H-2]
Historically, a contractor's legal liability was limited
by a requirement to prove negligence in producing a defective
or dangerous product. However,
modern product liability law has expanded significantly the
liability of product manufacterers . Restatement (Second)
of Torts S 402A (1965) establishes "strict liability" in
tort for the sale of a product in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." [8:H-1]
"Agent Orange", asbestos, and radiation injury litigation
abound based on renewed notions of latency. [8:H-2] Many years
after design and production, occasionally even after the
Government has sold the "defective" product as surplus, there
are allegations of defects causing injury. Precedence has pro-
vided that in a variety of cases of service-related injuries,
even where a defective product may have resulted from a di-
rected design, the liability of the Government is limited by
it's sovereign nature and that the contractor's liability is
not so limited. [27]
C. LEGISLATED RISK MANAGEMENT
The concept of regulated risk management is not new. It was
not until the turn of the last century, however, that the
affluence and complexity of American society raised itself to
the point of permitting widespread pre-emption of individual
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attempt to alter working conditions in the marketplace while
superseding existing market mechanisms for their establish-
ment and maintenance.
D. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
In order to understand the essential nature of the warranty
issue in attracting the attention of Congress, the general
state of Congressional oversight of the Defense acquisition
process is presented.
Not too many years ago, the oversight of Congress mani-
fested itself on the Defense Department in the "HASC" and
"SASC", the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. With
the reformulation of the budget process came more emphasis
from the Appropriations Committees and the Finance Committees.
As individual Congressional persona developed their own power
bases, other committees entered the picture, for instance the
House Government Operations Committee, Judiciary Committee,
and Ways and Means, as well as the Senate Budget and Small
Business Committees. There were also a number of Ad Hoc groups,
as well, such as the Military Reform Caucus.
In the Spring of 1984, there were over 185 different pieces
of pending legislation which directly or indirectly impacted
the Defense procurement process. [30] While some of these
bills represented overlapping proposals, the message is still
clear ... there is no dearth of Congressional interest.
The results of this proliferation were decried most articu-
lately by Senator John Tower, Chairman of the Senate Armed
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risk choice behavior. The precursor to the concept that
market forces alone are insufficient to enforce risk-minimiza-
tion behavior among producers and providers of consumer
products was Upton Sinclair. His book, The Jungle
,
was a
purposely disgusting expose of unhealthful food processing pro-
cedures which led directly to the passage of the Pure Food and
Drug Act. [28]
A recent risk reduction mechanism developed through the
legislative process is the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA) . OSHA was born out of a desire to
regulate job risks and other associated hazards under the as-
sumption that risk assessment by workers was unsatisfactory or
imprecise, that there was inadequate insurance available to
workers to indemnify them in an environment of rapidly escalat-
ing legal and medical expenses, and that the role of the
Government should be altruistic in shielding its citizens
from danger. [29:6]
There were, and continue to be, a number of basic problems
with the concept of OSHA as a risk regulator. The basic dif-
ficulty is the underlying assumption that society should be
risk-free. [29:3] Also, there is the implicit concept within
the OSHA regulatory structure that risks are generated, not
by the choice of knowledgeable individuals, but rather are
generated by mistaken technological decisions made independent
of any cost considerations. [29:3] A corollary to this concept
of ignoring the costs and benefits of mandated changes is the
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Services Committee, in his remarks before the Senate Budget
Committee in March of 1984. [31:54] His basic feeling that
Congress considers Defense issues primarily in terms of near-
term affordability is clearly stated in five elements which
he considers crucial to the regaining of a credible manage-
ment by Congress: [31:56]
1. Assess the basic relationship between Congress and the
Executive Branch. The American people are not paying
for 535 "Chief Executive Officers".
2. Assess the increasing involvement of Congress in the
establishment of Defense and Foreign policy. Bipartisan
commissions were effective in resolving the issue of
Social Security, as an example, and should be established
to minimize the protracted debate over Foreign and
Defense policy.
3. Consider reforms to elimiate unnecessary layering and
overlapping jurisdictions.
4. Develop a greater sense of leadership and appreciation
for America's role in the world striking a balance
between the instant desires of constituents and the
broader requirements of global political leadership.
5. Rebuild a bi-partisan concensus on Defense and Foreign
policy. The results of bitter disagreement over Defense
policy are detrimental not only in the sense of physical
production, but also as a signal to our allies and
opponents
.
To expect immediate action on the part of the Congress to
dramatically alter the perception of and solution to Defense
issues is unrealistic for several reasons in addition to
Senator Tower's concerns. With the great percentage of
Congress comprising freshman members, there is a real (or at
least political) imperative to establish a "name". To be able
to take credit with one's constituents for the resolution of
some "thorny" issue is always a consideration.
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The current relationship between Congress and DOD was
characterized by Mr. Alan Yuspeh, General Counsel, Senate
Armed Services Committee, in a speech before the National
Contract Management Association. There is real skepticism
over the competence and conscientiousness of the leadership
of the Department of Defense. [32] Some of this concern is
undoubtedly a backlash from the strong Reagan administration
position on Defense issues, but not all. [32] There is a
sincere desire for a reduction in aggregate Defense spending
levels, as well. [32] Although the level of Federal human
services spending has gone from a small percentage of Defense
spending in 1955 to over twice the level of DOD spending in
recent fiscal years, there is still the perception, viewed
differently by the two major American political adherents, that
Defense spending is taking food from the mouths of our children.
It is a complex and emotional problem, one which is beyond the
scope of this paper. It needs to be recognized, however, as
a driver of intense Congressional interest.
Another dramatic difficulty with the warranty issue is its
essential emotional nature. An editorial from the Houston Post
of February 21, 1984 provides a perception of the frustration
felt by American taxpayers with paying for the apparent repair
of military equipment delivered in an inadequate or defective
condition. The last line of the editorial -- "We taxpayers are
sick of it, too!" -- is a good example of this frustration. [33]
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The emotion, however, is more extensive than merely a
lack of patience with the management of the weapon systems
acquisition process on the part of the taxpayers who are
generally removed from the complexities of the procedure. A
basic sense of the problem develops from a misunderstanding
of the necessity to maintain a state-of-the-art level of
technology in the development and, more critically, the deploy-
ment of weapon systems. [12] An analyst of Soviet weapon
system development and acquisition policy, speaking at the
Naval Postgraduate School, pointed out that their emphasis is
on reliability and simplicity of operation. There are those
who would suggest that such a policy is a more realistic use
of the American defense dollar.
Although the primary reason for the Soviets fielding
simple weapon systems is more closely related to the severe
penalty for failure, there is a more compelling historical
reason for staying current. The level of world-wide technology
follows an exponential growth pattern such that the magnitude
and impact of developments experienced over the last thirty
years will be matched in the next fifteen. [34] Throughout
history, the geopolitical balance has been shaped by the
technology of weaponry. The long-bow, gunpowder, steam
powered steel warships, the airplane, the submarine, and
nuclear weaponry all were crucial in establishing winners and
losers in international "competition". The winners were those
who could develop and effectively deploy the new technology
first.
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E. THE DEFENSE MARKETPLACE
The last of the contextual relationships to recognize in
developing an understanding of the warranty legislation is
the structure of the Defense industrial marketplace.
The Defense marketplace is one of intense regulatory
presence. Most interviewees felt not only that there are
voluminous regulations and statutes dealing with every aspect
of both sides of a potential sale, but that there are numerous
other infringements upon the autonomy of the business relation-
ship, as well. Among these is the use of detailed specifications
by the seller identifying as comprehensively as possible the
attributes of a product or service. [35' 49] The Government
also imposes upon the contractor a complex set of accounting
requirements in support of the analysis attendant to a cost-
based contract pricing system. Not only are there rules
regulating the relationship between the Government and the
Contractor, but there are a great many statutes and regulations
with purely socio-economic impact, operating as an instrument
of the welfare of the Federal Government. [36:279] There are
provisions governing wage rates, working hours, minority and
small business set-asides, the purchase of foreign hand
tools or busses, the use of recycled materials, the prohibit-
ion of kickbacks, and a wide variety of other mandates.
[36: 286]
A second variation from standard free market industry is
the composition of the business cycle. The Defense business
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cycle is longer than almost any commercial situation, ranging
in the neighborhood of ten years. By the time a company has
developed the required research and development effort and
accepted the cost of making a credible proposal for a weapon
system's development and production, there has been commit-
ment of great amounts of capital and resources. The contract
or is then locked into a relationship with the Government
which could last decades. An employee at North American
Rockwell, a successful major aerospace contractor, without
missing a day of work in thirty years, would still have seen
only two roll-outs, the space shuttle and the B-l bomber.
The funding profile of the Defense marketplace also re-
quires consideration. The normal operation of contract per-
formance funding differes from standard commercial use in
the common application of progress payments, and we have al-
ready touched on the requirement for great amounts of start-
up capital, but there are other structural differences as
well. To begin with, there are political implications in
the funding of major weapon systems. The B-l is a superior
example of the on-again, off-again authorization inherent in
our political system. Probably the greatest issue in the
funding cycle of the Department of Defense is its nature
within the Federal budget system. Roughly 70 percent of the
Federal budget is expended in entitlement programs. [37]
These are social or welfare type expenditures like social
57
security benefits or food stamps which cannot be altered or
diminished without changing the statutes on which they are
based. In addition, due to their nature, they are almost
always politically sensitive. The 30 percent of the budget
that is not entitlement in nature is represented heavily by
the Defense Department. Although spending for national
defense has dropped from about 60 percent of total Federal
outlays in the early 1950's to roughly 25 percent in the
early 1980's, it represents almost all of the Federal Govern-
ment's discretionary outlay, and therefore is subject to
intense Congressional interest. [35:20]
The final structural consideration is the general character
ization of the market itself. Unlike general commercial
enterprise, the Defense marketplace is monopsonist ic (several
sellers and one buyer). This situation, when combined with
the sovereign nature of the buyer, creates a condition where
the buyer generally rules the marketplace. [35:73] In the
case of the Defense industry, however, because of the com-
plexity built into the regulatory system and the decentralized
nature of acquisition management, the power is not as one-
sided as it could be.
Within this monopsony, there is increased consolidation
of production sources. The number of sources for battle tank
castings has gone from five in 1960 to one. [35:144] There
are only two airborne radar system subcontractors and only
two sources for aircraft engines. [35:130] This consolidation
has created an intense "rivalry" competition which, when
coupled with the length of the business cycle and the fact
that there has been a steady decrease over the last fifteen
years in the absolute number of weapon systems deliveries,
turns every solicitation into an all or nothing proposition.
F . SUMMARY
There are four basic contextual considerations which must
be understood to gain a clear grasp of the intent and poten-
tial effect of recent warranty legislation. The demise of
the concept of "caveat emptor", the introduction into society
of regulated risk management, the interest of Congress in
Defense acquisition, and the basic structure of the Defense




IV. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The next step in developing an understanding of the war-
ranty issue as it effects acquisition managers is to look at
the Congressional level action that has ensued over the last
eighteen months regarding warranties. We will examine the
events leading up to the introduction of Senator Andrews'
legislation into the FY1984 Department of Defense Appropriation
Act, the DOD implementation guidance for the legislation, the
industry and political reaction to the DOD guidance, and the
efforts taken in Congress to ameliorate the situation.
B. DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE LEGISLATION
In 1978, acquisition initiatives developed by Air Force
General Alton D. Slay as Commander of the Air Force Systems
Command included expansion of the use of warranties in Air
Force weapons procurement, with emphasis on warranty utilization
included in such projects as the Air-Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM) , Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) , and
various jet fighter engine procurements. [25:A-1]
Slay's efforts were not directed solely toward negotiating
contracts with warranty provisions, however. Two concurrent
efforts to improve the state of the art of product assurance
were initiated.
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The Air Force Product Performance Agreement Guide (PPAG)
was developed with the assistance of industry, providing
annotated examples of warranties with descriptions, a dis-
cussion of applicability, measurement of compliance, and
advantages and disadvantages in any particular procurement
for a number of warranty provisions. [25:A-2]
The Air Force initiated the second of the concurrent
efforts in December of 1980, describing a "Product Performance
Agreement Center" to be established at Wright - Patterson Air
Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, to serve as a DOD-Industry
clearinghouse for product performance data and analysis.
[25:A-2] The contractor's effort in the solicitation was
wide ranging, including annual updates to the PPAG, risk/cost
benefit modeling, and general administrative support.
The Air Force was not alone in progressing the issue of
warranty utilization and administration, although their program
was by far the most ambitious. The Army, in January of 1981,
published AR 702-13 to establish the policies and procedures
for administration of the Army's warranty program. [38] A
study published by the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity
Logistics Studies Office, however, concluded that the regula-
tion was neither well known nor universally applied and showed
that the utilization and administration of warranties by buying
command emphasis applied. [39:3] The efforts of some commands
yielded effective results and some did not. The study went on
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to provide recommended changes to the structure and distrib-
ution of the regulation and included a simplistic guide for
negotiating warranty provisions. The general policy of the
Army, however, was summed up in the last paragraph of the
study: [39:1-5]
Finally, remember that it is Army policy that warranties
will not be acquired under normal circumstances. A warranty
will be sought if it cannot be equitably removed from a
commercial item, or if it will provide a definite benefit
to the Army; the decision to acquire a warranty will be
made only if the decision maker is convinced absolutely that
one of the aforementioned conditions prevail.
While these developments were in motion, the Air Force
was negotiating the F-100 jet engine, installed in F-15 and
F-16 fighter aircraft, with Pratt and Whitney/United Technolo-
gies and with General Electric. Pressuring the Air Force to
increase the significance of the warranty in the procurement
evaluation, Pratt and Whitney beat out General Electric whose
warranty provision was not as generous.
During this period, as well, there was an effort by the
Defense Acquisition Regulatory (DAR) Council to improve the
DAR and FAR guidance on warranty application and administra-
tion. [40:A-25] While the changes under consideration were
not considered substantive, they were in reaction to the
general feeling among DOD field contracting activities that
warranty guidance was inadequate. Among other changes, pro-
posed new language discussed:
- when to employ a warranty
- the use of billback terms (reimbursement by the contractor
for a covered claim repaired by the Government or a third
party)
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- command designated warranty control personnel with the
primary responsibility for administering warranties and
warranty claims. [40:A-25]
Compared to later industry input, the comments regarding
these proposed warranty changes were self-serving and parochial
The main thrust of the objections dealt with the difficulties
of administering billbacks, minimizing the notification to
customers and marking of warranted products, and trading off
warranties for in-plant surveillance. The idea that a strong
warranty meant that obtrusive in-plant Government inspection
("...costly Government involvement in contractor internal
affairs...") could be reduced was later dropped by industry
representatives in higher visibility discussions and Con-
gressional testimony. [41:1]
The Andrews warranty provision was offered from the floor
as an amendment to H.R. 4185, the fiscal year 1984 Department
of Defense Appropriation Act, and appeared to take everyone by
surprise. However, Senator Andrews had drafted the proposal
as early as mid-July of 1983 and had provided it to various
industry groups for comment.
Typical of the kinds of industry responses to the initial
Andrews bill was this opening comment taken from an internal
memorandum provided by a major aerospace prime contractor:
As a generalization, the proposed amendment is so
hopelessly out of phase with economic reality, good con-
tracting practice and common sense that it is impossible




The memo continued with what were considered to be among
the more notable deficiencies of the amendment:
- the application of performance warranties to low volume
productions of low maturity items
- the fact that the law would require modification of numerous
existing contracts
- that placing a requirement on cost type contracts for the
the contractor to bear all the costs of repair or replace-
ment effectively eliminates such contrasts
- that "performance requirements" frequently change over
the life of a weapon system
- that contractors would be unwilling to warrant a design
over which it had no control.
These issues, and others, were discussed in a meeting be-
tween industry representatives and Senator Andrews in Fargo,
North Dakota, on August 11th which was centered on the ap-
plicability to defense contracting of commercial airline
practices. [42:1] The Senator discussed his reasons for de-
veloping the legislation, which were in part a desire to
mandate a commercial marketing environment upon the defense
acquisition process where both parties made and enforced
stricter commitments. The contractor representatives disagreed
with the Senator that such a condition was possible or even
desirable, or that even if such a situation was desirable
that the Andrews legislation would be able to foster such a
relationship
.
The discussion then centered around the requirement for
design control in order to warrant performance, reinforcing
the Senator's belief that the legislation, and subsequent
64
pressure from contractors, would alter DOD behavior, driving
buying agencies to withdraw design controls and act more like
commercial buyers. [42:3]
Between September 1983 and the date the Appropriations
Act became effective (December 8, 1983) there were a variety
of opportunities for testimony by the sponsor, by the Depart-
ment of Defense, and by Industry representatives.
Industry representatives, described by interviewees as
still wary after being stung repeatedly in the press over the
spare parts pricing issue, were unwilling to fight the war-
ranty issue with any vigor. Any indication that they were not
willing to make every effort to improve the acquisition process
was carefully avoided.
The Department of Defense also testified periodically over
the issue, but was hampered by an additional problem. At the
time the Andrews provision was introduced, there were well
over one hundred different pieces of pending legislation ef-
fecting the acquisition process. At the time, it was not
clear to the hierarchy at DOD that the warranty issue would
flare up so quickly with such intensity. Consequently, there
was no real hard evidence developed to support the DOD
position, and the testimony during this period demurred in
favor of continued study. [43]
Senator Andrews went on the offensive and posited his
case clearly before the Senate Appropriations Committee, as
well as making his position clear on the Senate floor. As
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quoted in the Congressional Record of the Senate from
November 14, 1983, Senator Andrews responded to previous
criticism of the legislation by Senator John Tower, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee:
The senior Senator from Texas .. states that: 'the builder...
would have to warrant the entire system even if the prime
contractor had no control over the design or manufacture
of numerous components.' Frankly, part of that is what we
must do. There is too much buckpassing about who has con-
trol over design and who has input into whether a certain
design is really practical and effective or not.
The purpose of the Warranty system... is to unleash the genius
of American industry, to make sure that sloppy and faulty
designs do not go into production at high costs to the tax-
payer and even worse, jeopardize the lives of our fighting
men who have to rely on these weapon systems. This is a
well established principle in the warranting of components
for commercial use. A farmer buys a tractor, he gets a
warranty on the overall tractor from the tractor manufacturer
on the engine from Caterpillar or Cummings , on the trans-
mission from Allison or whoever makes it. These warranties
are included together by the manufacturer and passed on to
the final purchaser. This is precisely the way... it should
work in military procurement. [44 : sl6053- sl6055]
C. THE FINAL LEGISLATION
The original proposed language reporting the legislation,
provided by an industry representative, read as follows:
The committee is concerned that for too long Congress has
been preoccupied with appropriating funds for changes in
military equipment production and endless supplemental re-
quests for spare parts for this equipment. In far too many
instances military equipment is inadequate in design or
prototype but is nevertheless procured before it is fully
proven or perfected. Tax dollars should no longer be
expended for the purpose of procuring equipment that is
operationally unreliable, does not meet the mission, task
and threat to the equipment and may imperil the lives of our
troops required to use it. In order to have a reliable and
cost effective national defense which will enable us to
protect ourselves and our vital interests throughout the
world, the committee recommends bill language which requires
66
the Department of Defense to obtain from the prime con-
tractor a performance or defect warranty when it procures
equipment produced from a perfected design prototype which
has been represented by the prime contractor as meeting
the specific performance requirements specified by the
Government and which is based on the mission, task and
threat to the equipment. The warranty will cover a
specified period from the date of acceptance by the
Government expressed in terms of years or of usage such as
the number of miles in the case of vehicles or the number
of rounds in the case of armaments as appropriate. The
warranty will provide that the manufacturer must bear the
cost of repairing or replacing any parts promptly that are
necessary to achieve the required performance requirements
and report all defects within sixty (60) days of the
discovery
.
Furthermore, the General Accounting Office is directed to
evaluate and report annually to the Committees of the
Congress, specifically the Appropriations and Armed Services
Committees, whether the Department of Defense is in com-
pliance with military equipment warranty provisions and to
report instances of non-compliance with warranty provisions
which it finds in the course of its audits of weapons sys-
tems programs and to recommend such improvements in compli-
ance as the Comptroller General considers appropriate.
The final legislation, included in Appendix A as it ap-
peared in the FY84 Defense Appropriations Act, was roughly
similar. It included reference to performance requirements
but no references to a "perfected design prototype". There
was no provision for a time limit to the coverage. The lang-
uage requiring continuous GAO monitoring was absent, and there
was a provision for the Secretary of Defense to waive the
requirements in some cases.
D. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE
In the normal course of the development of statutory re-
quirements, a "legislative history" is developed which serves
to assist in the interpretation of the corporate will of
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Congress and to act as legal precedent where it may be
necessary. Because of the derivation of this particular
legislation, no such data existed. With the signing of the
Appropriations Act, the Department of Defense was faced with
the complicated task of implementing what was viewed as a
potentially disruptive statutory requirement without the
benefit of any historic guidance.
On 29 November 1983, prior to the signing of the law, a
number of representatives from industry met with the DOD
Deputy General Counsel and members of the DOD acquisition
management staff. [46:1] A number of specific problems were
raised, such as the definition of the term "weapon system" in
the legislation. In addition, some generic issues were
raised, such as the ability of the insurance industry to pro-
vide appropriate indemnification and the potential effect of
the legislation on the spare parts breakout program. [46:2]
Following that meeting, a "Notice of Draft Guidance on
Written Guarantees" was developed, subsequently published in
the Federal Register on 20 January 1984, requesting written
comments to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering (Acquisition Management) (DUSDRE(AM)) no later
than 21 February 1984. [47:2502]
On 16 December 1983, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Thayer issued a 90-day blanket waiver of the requirements of
the law in order to provide DOD with time to resolve some of
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the policy issues and to issue guidance which would permit
implementation of the law with minimum disruption.
E. THE BATTLE IS ENGAGED
Described by most interviewees as an intentionally
restrictive and excessively literal interpretation of the
requirements of the legislation, the DOD guidance created in-
tense objection from Senator Andrews as well as from industry
Ms. Mary Ann Gilleece, DUSDRE(AM), tried to forestall some of
Andrews' objections by outlining the actions taken by OSD and
describing what she considered to be difficulties with im-
mediate implementation of the requirement. [49] Some of the
concerns and considerations included:
1. a potential requirement for pedigreed parts,
2. impact on component breakout,
3. impact on small businesses,
4. structure of flowdown procedures,
5. potential to impact field maintenance capabilities,
6. potential for delays to contracts currently being
negotiated
,
7. potential inhibition of technological innovation,
8. difficulty in determining credible failure rates.
Senator Andrews responded with a letter to Ms. Gilleece.
[50] While concurring with some of her comments, primarily
in the case of imminently concluded production contracts, he
provided counter-examples for other OSD concerns. Although
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the Senator proposed to outline his position clearly regard-
ing the warranty requirement, there were internal logical
difficulties with his reply.
Although the language of the legislation provided for a
waiver by the Secretary of Defense where a warranty require-
ment would not be cost effective, Senator Andrews' position
was that:
No funds shall be appropriated by this or any other act to
build a weapon system unless the prime contractor or con-
tractors provide the Government with a written guarantee.
[50:4]
Another passage which served to confuse the issue was the
elementary response to the OSD concern over the ability to
estimate accurately failure rates for high technology equip-
ments. Rather than acknowledge that such a difficulty exists,
the Senator provided the following lesson in statistics:
[50: 5]
Estimating failure rates accurately may not be so difficult
if you can reach an acceptable probability the weapon sys-
tem will work. One formula is as follows: p(pl)x(p2) or:
the probability of its subsystems working multiplied by
one another.
F. IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE PUBLISHED IN FEDERAL REGISTER
On 20 January 1984 the draft DOD implementing guidance
was released for public comment in the Federal Register and
is included as Appendix B. [47:2503] The reactions were not
without emotion and included almost 200 point papers and
letters containing positive and negative feedback from various
industry segments; small businesses, large Defense prime
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contractors, and numerous special interest lobby groups. The
following distillation of opinions is provided. It should be
noted that occasionally the flavor of an individual author's




a. the law will insure that weapon systems will work as
intended
b. warranties enhance reliability
c. warranties enhance performance
d. warranties act as a marketing incentive
e. warranties "minimize half-baked technology in a delivered
system"
f. warranties will cut the cost of defense procurement,
operations and maintenance, and training
g. prime contractors will have to diversify their subcon-
tractor base through warranty delegation
h. weapons will be more "trigger-ready"





a. small businesses are not capable of assuming the risks
of the initial warranty cost
b. small businesses are not capable of assuming the risk of
the contingent liability implied by the DOD draft
guidance
c. pedigreed parts may preclude breakout
d. small businesses cannot afford to remain tooled after
component delivery in support of prime contractor war-
ranty requirements
e. organic deployed maintenance capabilities may be lost or
underdeveloped
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f. the value of a warranty is questionable with a sole
source contractor
g. warranties increase surveillance and contract administra
tion costs
h. performance parameters can be adversely effected by the
Governments handling or operation of the system
i. failure rates are frequently not available for first
run equipments
j . the liability exposure incident to a system failure
caused by a component failure could be massive
k. the warranty requirement might result in a proliferation
of disputes and litigation
1. terms contained within the legislation are poorly de-
fined (i.e. production, weapon system)
m. duration of the warranty coverage is unspecified
n. performance specifications may be undefined or poorly
defined particularly in an environment of concurrency
o. costs cannot always be clearly defined
p. contractors will be unwilling to warrant a directed
design
q. warranties are inappropriate for cost type contracts
r. warranty indemnification/insurance costs are not con-
sidered allowable by cost accounting standards
s. there is no provision for a liability ceiling
t. retroactive language calls for modification of extant
contracts
u. prime contractors are drawn into a position of "no
fault" liability where any defect must be corrected at
no cost to the Government
v. mandated warranties inhibit innovative technology
w. warranties may not necessarily be cost effective
x. there will be cost pyramiding of contingent pricing
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y. weapon systems acquisitions frequently result in
short production runs and poor field testing as well
as comprising a restricted customer allocation base
over which to amortize warranty costs
While comments on the legislation began to filter in,
there was apparent concern at OSD that the issue was not being
pursued as aggressively as possible by the Defense industry.
On 10 February 1984, Mr. Harvey Gordon, Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(Acquisition Management) took his case to the National Contract
Management Association Regional Symposium at Sacramento,
California. [51]
Mr. Gordon described the DOD strategy in developing and
publishing the draft guidance to elicit "a great number of
inputs pointing out the deficiencies" and went on to describe
what OSD considered to be deficiencies with the legislation.
The first problem, according to Mr. Gordon, was that the
language of the legislation was imprecise. He provided as
examples the terms "weapon system", "procurement", and
"component" among others. For laymen, these terms have proxi-
mate meanings as elements of conversation, however, Mr. Gordon
argued that in a legal sense they need a contextual definition
which was not provided by the legislation.
Mr. Gordon went on to outline specific issues that OSD
felt were "incorrect presumptions which underlie the legisla-
tion". The first was the implicit denial of production con-
current with development of a weapon system. Gordon pointed
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out that in aircraft construction it has been common to
award the third production option before completion of opera-
tional test and evaluation.
Second, Gordon discussed the difficulty in expecting a
second source manufacturer to warrant a separately provided
directed design.
I cannot for the life of me comprehend how a manufacturer
of a system can guarantee that the system is designed and
manufactured to conform to meet the performance requirements
when he did not do the design but just is doing the manu-
facture as a follow-up for example, or as a second source.
The third assumption pointed out was the difficulty in per-
mitting construction of a weapon system solely to a performance
requirement. Gordon argued that such an agreement would elimi-
nate the legal requirement to maintain any sort of baseline
configuration as the manufacturer would have the unilateral
right to change the design to accommodate any production
requirements
.
The fourth issue that Gordon attacked was the sweeping
problem of cost effectiveness of warranty provisions. Costs
for deployed maintenance, administrative costs for the
Government, and contractor contract execution procedures were
all held up as potential complications developed by the law.
The fifth objection related to the magnitude of warranties
involved in a weapon system. The example given was the B-l
bomber with 19,000 vendors. With each vendor potentially
having different variations of guarantee provisions, the
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difficulty of keeping them all straight becomes enormous and,
by implication, expensive.
The sixth assumption of the legislation attacked by
Gordon was that, rather than expand the liability of the con-
tractor to improve the quality and suitability of weapon
systems, use of a commercial type warranty provision really
limites the legal liability of the contractor.
The last of what Gordon considered limiting presumptions
touches on the difference between the commercial and Defense
marketplace. The specific point was that in the commercial
world the manufacture has design and configuration control
and can define acceptable operating and periodic maintenance
requirements. Such conditions are not applicable to Defense
contracts
.
After addressing what he considered to be deficiencies in
the legislation, Mr. Gordon went on to discuss the desire of
DOD to repeal the law or, as a fallback position, to develop
alternative language which would be more reasonable from the
perspective of DOD. [51]
The DOD effort to force repeal was met with resistance in
the press and from members of Congress. Part of the difficulty
experienced by DOD came from contradictory statements of
Secretary Weinberger. On 6 February 1984, Weinberger appeared
before the Senate Budget Committee and assured Senator Andrews
that he was striving to make the legislation work. However,
within a week it was pointed out that the Fiscal 1985
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President's Budget Appendix included a request to repeal the
warranty provision. [52] Further pressure in the press [53]
and from members of Congress [54] finally resulted with
Weinberger relenting.
While the basic reaction both in the press and in
Congress was one of distracted amazement with the continuing
aversion of DOD to the "will of Congress," [55] in early
March 1984, an undercurrent of dismay with the complexity of
the warranty problem began to develop. After extensive
hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in late
February 1984, there was some realization that there were
inadequate hearings held before enactment of the legislation
and that further hearings were necessary to fully resolve the
issue . [56]
On 15 March 1984, the final formal DOD guidance regarding
the implementation of the warranty provision was issued. Al-
though the guidance did not represent any great departure from
what was expected, its release was occasioned by Senator Ted
Stevens (R-Alaska) ordering a GAO review to determine com-
pliance with the law.
It was this report, issued 24 April 1984, which finally
ameliorated the intense criticism of the Department of Defense
implementation effort.
The report pointed out the imprecision in the language of
several critical sections of the implementing legislation. It
also took issue with the DOD blanket waiver of all cost-type
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contracts from the requirements. However, the bottom line
was clear [57:1]
:
We believe the DOD guidance and model guarantee clause,
issued in final form on March 14, 1984, are consistent
with and do not go beyond the requirements of the statute.
G. THE FY85 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
When the GAO report was published, the warranty issue
went "underground". It was clear to both the proponents and
the opponents of the warranty legislation that nothing more
was to be gained by continued public whipping of the issue.
Rather, it was felt that a rewritten version was necessary,
clarifying the inadequacies of the original legislation while
maintaining the basic warranty requirement. [32]
Under the guidance of Mr. Alan Yuspeh, General Counsel of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, testimony was reviewed
and comments were solicited from the various factions. The
first order of business was to develop a legislative history
on which to base and later interpret the rewritten statute.
The second, albeit concurrent, effort was to develop the re-
written statute as a section of the FY85 Defense Authorization
Act in a form acceptable to the three major camps (DOD,
Senator Andrews, and the Contractors).
The compromise effort was published on 31 May 1984 as
Section 191 of the Defense Authorization Bill, S. 2414. The
legislative history identified three major concerns with the
original legislation: [3:241-242]
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- the potential adverse impact on the ability of small
business to compete for defense contracts driven by the
potential for disproportionate liability expenses and
by the potential anti-competitive requirement for pedi-
greed parts
- mandating a warranty under concurrency or for untested
weapon systems could lead to either overpriced warranties
or downward negotiation of performance requirements, with
either situation being undesirable
- the imposition of no-fault liability in the event of a
directed design
Section 2403 (included as Appendix C) set about to
address these deficiencies.
It was recognized, as pointed out by the GAO report on
the DOD warranty guidance, that there were several terms
appearing in the original legislation which required definition
in order to establish a common base for discussing the subse-
quent provisions. The terms defined were: [3:242-243]
- weapon system or other defense equipment -- items that can
be used directly by the armed forces to carry out combat
missions. For purposes of the statute, only systems which
on a per unit basis cost more than $100,000, or for which
the eventual total procurement is more than $10 Million,
are covered
- prime contractor -- a party that has entered into an agree-
ment directly with the United States to furnish part or
all of the weapon system or other defense equipment
- design and manufacturing requirements -- the structural
and engineering plans, and manufacturing particulars,
setting forth precise measurements, tolerances, materials,
processes, and in process and finished product tests for
the weapon system or other defense equipment
- essential performance requirements -- the operating cap-
abilities or maintenance and reliability characteristics
of a weapon system or other defense equipment that are
determined by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary for
the system or equipment to fulfill the military require-
ment for which it was designed
- component -- any constituent element of a weapon system or
other defense equipment
- mature full scale production -- the manufacture of all
units of a weapon system or other defense equipment after
the manufacture of either the first 10 percent of the
eventual total production of such system or equipment or
the initial production quantity, whichever is less
- initial production quantity -- the number of units of a
weapon system or other defense equipment contracted for
in the first year of full scale production.
The new legislation addressed the problem which potentially
would plague small businesses by exempting entities other than
the prime contractor from mandated warranties. The legislation
calls for the traditional system where the prime contractor
assumes responsibility for the whole system and then obtains
warranties from subcontractors as appropriate. [3:244]
The risk inherent in warranting initial production units
is minimized through the caveat that the mandatory requirement
for a guarantee that the system meets required essential per-
formance requirements only applies during mature full-scale
production, as defined above. [3:247-248]
The approach to the last of the major issues, that of "no
fault liability" resulting from directed designs, is not as
straightforward. Under the new law, the contractor must
warrant conformance to essential performance requirements, but
only after negotiation during full-scale production. [3:244]
There are other revisions as well. One of the most
significant is the restructuring and relaxing of the require-
ment to report any waivers to the Congress. Under Section 794,
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waivers were permitted. However, DOD interviewees described
the reporting requirement as so stringent and the emotion
surrounding incomplete implementation of the law ran so high
that any waivers developed below the Secretary of Defense
level were simply out of the question regardless of the
justification. Under the new law, both class waivers and
individual waivers are permitted. More importantly, in the
accompanying legislative history, the "cost-effectiveness"
waiver is depicted not as an "extraordinary mechanism" but
rather as a potential natural result of conscientious negotia-
tions between DOD and the contractor. [3:246-247]
Another significant change revolves around the requirement
for remedies. Unlike the original legislation, the revised
version permits DOD some flexibility in requiring remedies.
In some cases an assessment against the contractor of the full
amount of a warranty remedy may be inequitable. The new
legislation allows DOD to be guided by traditional concepts
of "equitable adjustment" in the administration of the
warranty . [3:2 50]
H. SUMMARY
The warranty issue did not spring up overnight. Since
1978 it has been an increasingly important issue in the manage
ment of Defense acquisition. The DAR Council has addressed
the coverage of warranties in the FAR and the services have
developed comprehensive, albeit not necessarily cohesive,
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positions regarding the employment of warranties. Warranties
became an emotional public issue with the introduction of
Senator Andrews' legislation requiring their use in Defense
weapon systems procurements in 1983. The emotion heightened
with the reactions of DOD, the services, and the industry.
It was not until GAO concurred with the DOD implementation of
the original legislation that the way was cleared for a less
offensive revision, which appeared in the FY85 Defense
Authorization Act.
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V. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
The warranty issue has been, over the last eighteen
months, a microcosmic example of Congressional administration
and regulation of the Defense acquisition process. It has
included all the major players in Defense acquisition policy;
Congress, DOD, representatives of small and large Defense
contractors, and the press. It has embodied political im-
peratives and machinations.
Initially, the issue gave all the appearance of being
benign and mundane. It was nominally based on the relatively
simple premise of assuring delivery to strict quality stand-
ards of Defense weapon systems. The proponents of the legis-
lated requirement could not see why anyone would argue with
the concept of "getting our money's worth". Opponents were
equally distressed that numerous debilitating flaws in the
law were going unrecognized.
From the beginning, the Department of Defense was slow
out of the starting blocks. DOD fought the legislative
requirement mandating warranties as being costly and unenforce
able, but the political initiative belonged to Senator Andrews
DOD took issue with the language of the original legislation
as being vague in some places and imprecise in others, but was
unwilling to provide possible compromise language while there
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was any hope of repeal of the law. There was a general frus-
tration that the issue was more complex than most Members of
Congress realized, including Senator Andrews. In the final
analysis, there was never any disagreement that a well-
negotiated warranty package could be an asset to almost any
weapon system procurement. The issue was over the broad
reach and potential unintended drawbacks to the original
legislation .
From the perspective of Industry practioners, the war-
ranty issue was unusual in its ability to rally the support
of diverse and competitive sectors. There was an unusually
high level of communication among both small and large
businesses which was relatively void of parochial interest.
In general, their fight took on the same character as the DOD
argument. The feeling was that while warranties per se could
be valuable, mandating them in every case was curiously
irrational. In the words of Mr. John E. Cavanaugh , a partner
with McKenna, Conner, and Cuneo of Los Angeles, "The idea that
farm tractors are analogous to weapon systems has a certain
wholesome goofiness about it". [ 58]
Although the initial reaction of Congress to the distaste
for the law as presented by the practioners was one of out-
rage over the rejection of the "will of the Congress",
eventually there was a recognition of the complexity of the
issue and the initial effort was reconsidered. If there was
not such political posturing, emotion, and "motherhood" over
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"getting what we pay for" from Defense contractors, the law
may even have been repealed.
This is not to suggest that the only issue involved is
whether or not to mandate warranty coverage on DOD acquisitions.
Nor even that once the Congress realized that warranties are
more than "indemnification clauses", there would be an appre-
ciation for their use and their limitations. There are two
related issues that play heavily on the discussion.
First is the general strategic concept, embraced almost
universally within current military force structure planning,
that maintaining a credible defense posture in the face of
large scale mult i- theater aggression requires the development
and deployment of high technology weapon system alternatives.
While such a concept appears plausible from the point of view
of the military manager and simultaneously appears reasonable
to most military and geopolitical historians, there is an
increasing sense of uneasiness among many Americans and
Europeans that we are developing a mechanized defense capability
which is being tuned to react faster than its human "masters"
and which, once activated, may not be recalled. The lessons
of history aside, it is not unreasonable to expect that a
hair-trigger command and control system coupled to the current
inventory of deadly weapons might appropriately cause a sense
of corporate nervousness within the electorate.
The second issue, although less compelling in terms of
its emotional appeal, is still a significant issue in terms of
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the management of the Defense industrial marketplace. The
dramatic differences between the standard commercial market-
place and the Defense marketplace are frequently misunderstood
or neglected as a political expedient. Some of the variation
is structural in nature and other aspects are the result of
legislative or regulatory mandate. In either event, pressure
often is applied to modify the performance of the Defense
marketplace through the direct application of commercial
practices which may or may not apply.
The history of the current warranty mandate includes
mechanical difficulties in addition to these "philosophical"
problems. At one point, Senator Andrews indicated that the
original law he proposed was intended only to change the
emphasis of the implementation of the DAR/FAR warranty clauses
from including a warranty only when it can be demonstrated to
be cost effective to including a warranty unless it can be
demonstrated not to be cost effective. There could be an
argument made for such a change to the inclusion of warranty
coverages, especially considering their rapidly increasing
commercial proliferation. Even so, however, the law was poorly
written and poorly staffed. There were few hearings held to
discuss the issue and, because of the current state of the
legislative process, early testimony tended to be poorly sup-
ported and superficial.
The legislation was also poorly staffed in the sense of
the relationship between Congress and DOD. There is a basic
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structural differences between legislative and executive
policy development and administration. Legislatures are
"graded" on the development of new rules and procedures in
response to problematic conditions occurring in the administra-
tion of the Government. Executive departments, however, are
"graded" on the basis of developing solutions to problems
within the existing regulatory/statutory environment. This
relationship has helped to lead to an environment where the
impression is that Congress is "micromanaging" the efforts
of the executive branch. This, in turn, has contributed to
the development of an adversarial relationship at the working
level between Congress and DOD. This relationship has been
a roadblock to the development of useable warranty legislation
It would be presumptive in this work to espouse some
platitudes that propose to solve all the perceived management
problems of the United States Government. Considering the
metaphysics of the legislative process, the counterplay among
leaders of the Legislative and Executive branch is probably
healthy. Similarly, although Senator Tower and many others
perceive and decry a lack of leadership in Congress, such
manipulation is within the nature of Congress and a satis-
factory solution cannot necessarily be externally imposed by
attempting to change the structure of the body. However, at
the staff level, there is great aversion and animosity be-
tween the executive and legislative factions. This serves to
foster a relationship characterized by mutual distrust with
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both motives and data and could hardly be considered an
efficient system for maintaining a continuing and productive
relationship
.
If the intent of the legislation is broader than Senator
Andrews initially claimed, implying a change to the basic
marketing concept under which the nation's Defense assets are
procured, there is no question that it was at least poorly
conceived and potentially impossible to administer. It is
no mere assertion of a Machiavelian "hidden agenda" to assume
that there is more to the legislative intent than merely
pressuring a broader use of the current requirements. In his
early meetings with industry executives, and during later
testimony, Senator Andrews discusses the desirability of driv-
ing the Defense marketplace toward a more commercial type
environment. In such an environment, the contractor provides
some stable piece of technology in response to and within an
established framework of requirements determination, design,
development and production control. This interpretation of
the development of the warranty legislation invokes a
significantly more complex analysis, one which was totally
neglected during the testimony. Even if it was possible through
the simplistic language of the P.L. 98-212 warranty language
to force a systemic change to the weapon systems acquisiton
process as basic as the issue of complete design control and
responsibility, for instance, it is not readily evident that
such a change would provide weapon systems in consonance with
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the current national technological Defense strategy. In
addition, there are numerous contract oversight responsibilities
currently administered by DOD, in-plant inspection during
production for instance, which would logically revert to the
contractor in a "commercial" environment. This would place
an increased burden on the user/recipient to determine, in a
detailed sense, that the equipment was manufactured to the
design. It is not that such a situation is inherently evil,
but it merely points out that the reconfiguration of the
Defense marketplace to a quasi-civilian/commercial marketplace
is significantly more complex than could be accomplished through
P.L. 98-212.
Several unanswered problems remain. Although the warranty
requirement is closely tied to the issue of cost- effect iveness
,
a reasonable system for permitting the contracting officer to
determine the cost/benefit relationships inherent in a warranty
package simply does not exist. Current theory defines a cost
effective warranty only as being a separately costed line item
less than a couple of percent of the total contract price.
Such a simplistic view, loosely based on commercial marketing
experience, neglects any potential variation of warranty pro-
visions and coverage as well as the potential for enforced
remedies
.
Another difficulty, causing deep emotion within the con-
tractor sector, is the effect of the legislation on small and
disadvantaged businesses acting as either prime contractors
or subcontractors. In this sense, the warranty issue does
not diverge from the monochromatic regulatory structure im-
posed on the Defense industry as a whole. It will remain a
matter of time for the full financial effect of the warranty
legislation to become evident.
The final difficulty, and potentially the most crucial,
remains the issue of enforcement. You can negotiate the
cleverest and most cost effective warranty provisions on
record, but if you can't enforce the requirements of the
provision, there is no gain. The inability to ensure that
contractual requirements are met are fed from two directions.
First, there is the records-keeping problem of maintain-
ing an awareness of what components and systems are warranted
at what level. Although our automated equipment management
systems are becoming more sophisticated, in most cases it is
still incumbent upon the field level technician to identify
and initiate a warranty claim action.
The second, and by far the most insidious, of the barriers
to effective warranty implementation is a matter of attitude.
It is not enough to understand the provisions and implications
of the warranty clauses we negotiate. We must be willing to
take whatever steps may be necessary to enforce them.
The bottom line to the warranty issue is the continuing
need to provide effective weapon systems to our soldiers and
sailors. Negotiating a cost effective warranty is only a
small part of managing a weapon system's operation and
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maintenance life cycle. It is incumbent upon the management
of the Defense establishment to ensure that the warranty
becomes a useful tool, integral to the equipment's availability,
rather than an administrative burden to the end user.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this research effort were to analyze
the issue of warranties in Defense acquisition in order to
develop a historical context, examine applicable costs and
benefits, and trace the current legislative history. In
accomplishing this, several conclusions have been reached.
Conclusion # 1 - Warranties covering Defense weapon systems
are significantly different from warranties covering com-
merci al _aj3p li cat i ons . Commercial warranties are generally
imposed to clearly define the limits of liability regard-
ing a product closely controlled by producer. While
Defense warranties also define the limits of product
liability for both the Government and the contractor, they
also serve frequently as product performance improvement
mechanisms. In addition, the commercial concept of strict
control over the product's design, capabilities, and
quantity produced does not apply to the current Defense
acquisition environment.
thwConclusion # 2 - The complexity of v&rranty issue was
not initially well- recognized within Congress . The paucity
of hearings, the lack of strong initial industrial response,
and the oversimplification of Senator Andrews' responses
to the initial DOD objections all served to mask the com-
plexity of the warranty issue. It wasn't until late Spring
1984 that Congressional leaders began to see the magnitude
of the problem.
Conclusion # 3 - The life cycle cost implications of war-
ranties on weapon systems are complex and poorly documented.
As discussed in Chapter II, warranties dramatically affect
numerous components of the cost of owning and operating a
weapon system. There have been numerous studies relating
to the costs of warranties on products distributed in the
commercial marketplace. There are, however, few studies
which even address the cost effectiveness of Defense weapon
systems warranties, much less define the discrete values
of the various cost elements affected.
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Conclusion # 4 - The warranty requirement of Section 794
of Public Law 98-212 was inappropriately conceived and
poorly drafted . It was not clear from the language of the
legislation whether the intent of the law was merely to
pressure DOD for the greater inclusion of warranty require-
ments in weapon systems procurements or to manipulate the
basic structure of the Defense marketplace. The vague
language made the intent of the law difficult to compre-
hend and odious in its apparent application.
Conclusion # 5 - The initial warranty legislation evolved
in a peculiar fashion and took the acquisition community
by surprise . The introduction of the warranty legislation
by Senator Andrews from the floor of the Senate was cer-
tainly not unprecedented. However, the legislation addressed
a complex legal and administrative issue without any sub-
stantial hearings and without any useful legislative his-
tory. The intent of the Congress was poorly transmitted
and it was left to acquisition managers and their legal
staffs to uncover the intent of the legislation and to
develop appropriate legal precedents.
Conclusion # 6 - Section 2504 of the FY85 Defense Authoriza -
tion Act and its accompanying legislative history correct
many of the deficiencies of the original warranty legis-
lation. As described in Chapter IV, the revised legislation
addresses numerous barriers to appropriate implementation
of the warranty requirement as envisioned by Congress
including
:
- the vagueness of the original language
- the effect on small business
- the issue of warranties in a concurrent environment
- no-fault liability in the event of a directed design.
Conclusion # 7 - Section 794 of Public Law 98-212 requiring
warranties on weapon systems acquired by the Department of
Defense has been fully implemented by DOD but only reluc-
tantly and after intense political machinations . As
described in Chapter IV , the General Accounting Office study
of April 1984 described the DOD implementation effort as
within the scope and intent of the law, although prior to
that study, the issue was the subject of intense public
debate and political posturing.
Conclusion # 8 - The adversarial relationship between Congress
and DOD at the working level is counterproductive and should
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be discouraged . Throughout the evolution of this legisla-
tive issue, the DOD and Congress have been at odds. While
it is within the nature of the political system for the
leadership to interact in such a fashion, it is disruptive
to the process when lines of communication at the working
level are severed or blocked by political posturing.
Conclusion # 9 - Congress has no clearly articulated policy
for the management of the Defense industrial base . As dis-
cussed in Chapter III, the current structure of the Defense
industrial base is more an effect of the complex Defense
acquisition process than the result of some clear develop-
mental initiatives by Congress. There is a constant pro-
liferation of overlapping legislative proposals, many of
which contain broad reaching and unintended deleterious
results. Rather than providing and maintaining an articu-
lated statement of national priorities, Congress tends,
rather, to develop and implement solutions to individual
problematic occurrences.
Conclusion # 10 - The enforcement of warranties is an im-
portant adjunct consideration to their usefulness which
has been neglected throughout most of the discussions re-
garding warranty legislation . The enforcement of remedies
has been a significant issue in every GAO warranty study
to date. Enforcement is crucial to any cost/benefit
analysis. There is no benefit where there is no enforcement
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation # 1 - The differences between commercial
warranties and Defense warranties should be addressed and
established . There are legal and structural differences
between the Defense and Commercial marketplace. Similarly,
there are legal and precedential differences between
Defense and commercial warranties. As an aid to increasing
the use of warranties within the Department of Defense, a
DOD policy should be developed and published which addresses
the intent, structure, and use of warranty clauses within
the Department of Defense and clearly distinguishes be-
tween DOD warranty applications and the applications found
in the commercial environment.
Recommendation # 2 - The Department of Defense should con-
tinue to monitor the implementation of the revised warranty
legislation and recommend improvements
. There are great
cost implications and potential benefits involved in a
viable warranty program. Additionally, the popular public
impression is that DOD is insensitive to the need for
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frugality. The budgeting credibility of DOD could be im-
proved through the identification and tracking of warranty
related issues, through- appropriate recommendations to
Congress increasing the effectiveness of legislative efforts,
and through providing continuing implementation guidance
to Defense agencies.
Recommendation # 3 - A comprehensive study should be under -
taken to identify and estimate cost elements peculiar to
the weapon system warranty . Warranties are understood in
the legislation to be inappropriate where they are not cost
effective. However, there exists no empirical data ad-
dressing the cost of a weapon system warranty compared to
the benefits derived. While it is understood that such a
study could potentially become cumbersome and complex,
there is still a need to provide the contract negotiator
with some understanding of Defense warranty cost behaviors
to compare with a contractor's proposal.
Recommendation # 4 - Warranty enforcement policies and
mechanisms should be reviewed and updated. Enforcement of
a warranty is critical to maximizing its benefit. As the
proliferation of warranties expands, personnel must be
trained and automated systems developed to identify war-
ranted equipments and to appropriately and efficiently en-
force warranty provisions.
Recommendation # 5 - There should be established within the
structure of Congress one entity responsible for the over-
sight and regulation of DOD acquisition . Because of the
political and economic implications , weapon systems ac-
quisition is a fruitful target of opportunity for many
different factions within the Congress. A single bi-
partisan commission should be established by an act of
Congress to administer Federal acquisition policy. This
one group would be tasked with the Congressional oversight
of the regulatory function as well as with reviewing and
establishing Defense acquisition policy. Instituting such
an arrangement would serve at least two crucial functions.
It would simplify the scope of legislation that each member
of Congress would have to deal with. There would be fewer
overlapping and redundant bills in the works. Additionally,
it would permit the Defense Department and Defense industries
to deal with a single voice of Congress, one which could
provide less conflicting regulatory and philosophic guidance.
Recommendation # 6 - Congress should define clearly the
appropriate structure of the Defense marketplace and di-
rect any legislation to developing and maintaining such an
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environment . It is confusing, in an economic sense, to
expect a free market environment for the purposes of some
legislation, and a monopsynist ic sovereign-directed market
for others. It is equally debilitating to neglect the
differences in resources and capabilities between small
business and major prime contractors when developing and
applying regulatory requirements. Agreement on the basic
structure and economic development of the Defense market-
place would at least provide a common basis for the de-
velopment of meaningful regulatory actions.
C. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION
How did the Department of Defense and the Defense Industry
implement the requirement for the private sector to warrant
weapon systems as provided for in P.L. 98-212 and what are
the implications of this implementation ?
Initially, the entire Defense acquisition community was
surprised by the warranty requirement imposed by P.L. 98-212.
It was apparent at DOD that the issue was larger than most
people thought and that the legislation implied historic and
heroic changes to the concept and application of warranties
in Defense acquisition. When the initial guidance was de-
veloped by DOD it was perceived by many as being unnecessarily
rigorous. It was a tough and strict construction of the
requirement designed to push the industry into rejecting the
requirement itself. While industry did finally respond, the
objections came too late to force repeal of the legislation.
There were sufficient objections, however, to press Congress




The long-term implications of the warranty issue have
not yet manifested themselves. It is not clear what effect
the legislation will have on the cost of weapon systems or
on the management of weapon system maintenance programs
within the Department of Defense. In addition, it is not
clear what effect, if any, the warranty issue will have on
the legislative process as it applies to Defense acquisition
regulation and management.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
The long term implications of the warranty legislation
on small business will only begin to become evident as war-
ranty provisions are negotiated and enforced on the full
range of contracts as called for by the legislation. A com-
prehensive examination of the financial impact of the war-
ranty legislation on small businesses over the next several
years would be appropriate.
Another cost implication of the warranty legislation is
the effect on the cost of individual weapon system contracts
There have been numerous estimates of the cost impact from
savings of twenty percent to increased costs of up to forty
percent. In fact, there have been few definitive studies
regarding the cost implications of warranties across the
spectrum of weapon system life-cycle costs.
The final issue in determining the long term effects
of the warranty legislation is in resolving the capability
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of the services to appropriately enforce the mandated war-
ranty provisions. What systems are in place to permit the
identification of warranted equipments by both the services
and by prime contractors? How effective are those systems?
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APPENDIX A
FY84 DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT
H.R.41S5
Binctg-dghth Congress of the Hnitd .States of 3mer
AT THE FIRST SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on .Monday, the third day of January;
one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three
3n 3ct
Miking appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 19S4. and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following
sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1984, for military functions administered by the Department of




For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on
deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including
all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses of
temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for mem-
bers of the Army on active duty (except members of reserve compo-
nents provided for elsewhere), cadets, and aviation cadets;
$15,048,533,000.
Military Personnel, Navy
For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on
deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including
all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses of
temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for mem-
bers of the Navy on active duty (except members of the Reserve
provided for elsewhere), midshipmen, and aviation cadets;
$11,171,278,000: Provided, That notwithstanding any other provision
of law, funds made available by this Act shall be available for
payment of the Aviation Officer Continuation Bonus pursuant to
agreements accepted from officers of ail aviation specialties where
shortages exist.
Military Personnel, Marine Corps
For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on
fy deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including
all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses ot
temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for mem-
bers of the Marine Corps on active duty (except members of the
Reserve provided for elsewhere); $3,433,859,000: Provided. That not-
withstanding any other provision of law, funds made available by
this Act shall be available for payment of the Aviation Officer
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demand. For the purposes of this Act, the requirement for "submis-
sion" of a shipbuilding claim, request, or demand is met only when
the certification required in section 6<cXl) of the Contracts Disputes
Act of 1978 is provided and the shipbuilding claim, request, or
demand is fully documented and substantiated in accordance with
regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 788. Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Defense, the Department of the Air Force, and Defense Logistics
Agency, may test a Hat rate per diem system for military and
civilian travel allowances: Provided, That per diem allowances paid
under a flat rate per diem system shall be in an amount determined
by the Secretary of Defense to be sulfioent to meet normal and
necessary expenses in the area in which travel is performed, but in
no event will the travel allowances exceed $75 for each day in travel
status within the continental United States: Provided further. That
the test approved under this section shall expire on September 30,
1985, or upon the effective date of permanent legislation establish-
ing a flat rate per diem system for military and civilian personnel,
whichever occurs first.
Sec. 789 None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used
for the transfer of the Department of Defense Dependents Schools
(DODDS) to the Department of Education, as prohibited by section
1223 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984.
Sec. 790. No part of the funds appropriated herein shall be
available for the purchase of more than 50 per centum of the fiscal
year requirements for aircraft power supply cable assemblies of
each military facility from industries established pursuant to title
18, United btates Code: Provided, That the restriction contained
herein shall not apply to small purchases in amounts not exceeding
$10,000.
Sec. 791. None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used
to purchase dogs or cats or otherwise fund the use of dogs or cats for
the purpose of training Department of Defense students or other
personnel in surgical or other medical treatment of wounds pro-
duced by any type of weapon: Provided, That the standards of such
training with respect to the treatment of animals shall adhere to the
Federal Animal Welfare Law and to those prevailing in the civilian
medical community.
Sec. 792. Beginning on April 1, 1984, or on the effective date of
the next adjustment in the General Schedule of compensation for
Federal classified employees, whichever occurs first, none of the
funds appropriated by this Act shall be available to pay Variable
Housing Allowance to a member pursuant to section 403(a), title 37,
United States Code, in an amount that exceeds the difference
between $800 and the amount of Basic Allowance for Quarters such
member receives pursuant to section 403, title 37, United States
Code, in the case of members with dependents, or the difference
between $600 and the amount of Basic Allowance for Quarters such
member receives pursuant to section 403, title 37. United States
Code, in the case of a member without dependents.
Sec. 793. The land and building located on the parce. described as
lot four (4), block four (4), Fairbanks Original Townsite, section 10
townsite 1 south, range 1 west, Fairbanks meridian, shall be trans-
ferred to the city of Fairbanks.
Sec. 794 (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, none of
the funds appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated or
expended for the procurement of a weapon system unless the orime
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contractor or other contractors for such system provides the United
States with written guarantees
—
ll) that the system and each component thereof were designed
and manufactured so as to conform to the Government's per-
formance requirements as specifically delineated (A) in the
production contract, or iB) in any other agreement relating to
the production of such system entered into by the United States
and the contractor,
(2) that the system and each component thereof, at the time
they are provided to the United States, are free from all defects
(in materials and workmanship) which would cause the system
to fail to conform to the Government's pertormance require-
ments as specifically delineated (A) in the production contract,
or (B) in any other agreement relating to the production of such
system entered into by the United States and the contractor;
and
(3) that, in the event of a failure of the weapon system or a
component to meet the conditions specified m clauses (1) and
(2>-
(A) the contractor will bear the cost of all work promptly
to repair or replace such parts as are necessary to achieve
the required pertormance requirements; or
(B) d the contractor fails to repair or replace such parts
promptly, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, the
contractor will pay the costs incurred by the United States
in procuring such parts from another source.
(b) A wntten guarantee provided pursuant to subsection (a) shall
not apply in the case of any weapon system or component thereof
which has been furnished by the Government to a contractor.
t'c) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirements oi
subsection (a) in the case of a weapon system if the Secretary'
—
ll) determines that the waiver is necessary in the interest of
the national defense or would not be cost-effective; and
(2) notifies the Committees on Armed Services and Appropri-
ations of the Senate and the House of Representatives in writ-
ing of his intention to waive such requirements with respect to
such weapon system and includes in the notice an explanation
of the reasons for the waiver.
(d) The requirements for written guarantees provided in subsec-
tion la) hereof shall apply only to contracts which are awarded after
the date of enactment of this Act and shall not cover combat
damage.
Sec 795. None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be
obligated under the competitive rate program of the Department of
Defense for the transportation of household goods to or from Alaska
and Hawaii.
Sec. 796. No funds appropriated for the Departments of Defense.
Army, Navy, or the Air Force shall be obligated by their respective
Secretaries for architectural and engineering services and con-
struction design contracts for Military Construction projects
in the amount of $85,000 and over, unless competition for such
contracts is open to all firms regardless of SLze in accordance with
40 U.S.C. §541, etseq.
Sec. 797. None of the funds made available by this Act shall be
used to initiate full-scale engineering development of any major
defense acquisition program until the Secretary of Defense has
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APPENDIX B
DRAFT GUIDANCE ON WRITTEN GUARANTEES
25P2 Federal Register / Vol. 49. No. 14 / Friday. |anuarv 20. 1984 / Notices
1983 (48 FR 55607). and December 3a
1983(48 FR 57584).
Ronald I. Levin.
Acting Chairman. Committer for the
' Implementation of Textile Agreements.
,
January 17. 1964. ....
Committee for th* Inylam—ilaAr of Taxttlc
Agf*cn*oi*
V* CocruTuaiioner of Custom*.
» Department of the Treaearf. Washington,
;;
ac -. •
; Dear Mr. Commitaionac Oadar th* turn* at
t. Section 30« of the Agricultural Act of 1966. a*
V amended (U 3.C ISM), pursuant to the)
- Bilateral Cotton, Wool anal Maa-aaade Fiber
', Textile Agreement of August IS, 1983,
£ betweeen the Covemmaota of the United
J. Stales and the People'! Republic of China
':. and in accordance with the pronator!* of
£'' Executive Order 11661 of March 1 Itrz. a*
amended, you are directed to prohibit
effective on lanuary 29. 1964. entry Into the
' Umtext State* for conaumpooa and
withdrawal from warebouao for conaumpboa
, of cotton textile product* In Category lot,
,
" produced or manufactured in the People*
|a Republic of Chine and exported during the
i • twelvemonth period begumlng on January
20. 1964 and extending through lanuary It,
I98S. in axon* of 736.788 doxxm. ' - i
T*» me product* In Category 362 which
have been exported to the United Slate* .<
during the ninety-day period which began oa i
October 22. 1963 shall be aubtsct to this. . .
„„
directive ... "..,., \ ., V. .
*•. A description of the textile categorise In
term* of TiitJ S A. number* we* publlihed In
the Federal Register on December 11 1962 (47
FR S5708I. a* amended oa Apnl 7. 1966 (U FR
- 15175). May 3. 1983 1*8 FR 1U8B4L December
14. 1964 |46 FR 35607). aaat Oajceanber» UU
(46FR5/S84).
...'.. atji-i..! ,.-. ._»,
In carrying out the above dtrecttoae. th*
Coaunjirionaf of r.^mwy* ajjeaaa B— n u*
entry into the United State* for coaarampooo
to include entry for consumption Into iha
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
The action taken with respect to the
Covemment of th* People'* Republic of
China and with reapect to Import* of cottoo
textile product* from China has been
determined by th* Committee for th*
Implaunesuatiea of Textile Agreemen n to >
;. Involve foreign affair* (uocnona of In* United
Slates. Therefore, these direction* I* the
Commissioner of Customs, which are
• necessary for the Implementation of such
'actions, fad w+thm the foreign affatr*
• exception to the rule-making proa>l*ions of 3





Acting Chairman. Commit— for the
Implementation of Tex tile Agreement*.
|F* Doc aa-tsa* n*d 1-lS-e*. fcU tm\
«UJM COOt IIIM«(I
COMMITTEE FOR PURCHASE FROM
THE BUND ANO OTHER SEVERELY
HANDICAPPED
Addition to Procurement Lint
tuwUAirr- This action add* to
Procurement List 1984 a commodity to
be produced by workshop* for th* blind
and other severely handicapped.
•TrlCTlVi DATE January 20. 1984.
ADOfttga: Committee for Purchas* from
the Blind and Other Severely
Handicapped. Cryita ! Square 5. Suit*
1107. 1735 Jefferson D« vis Highway,
Arlington. Virginia 22202.
©» r\nrrHf*t IN»tr)*tt*ATMN MHTiT




August 5. 1963, the Committee for
Purchase from th* Blind and Other
Severely Handicapped published a
notice (48 FR 35805) of proposed
addition to Procurement List 1984.
October 18. 1983 (48 FT? 48413).
After consider* Hon of th* relevant
matter presented, th* Committee hat
determined that th« commodity listed
below it sratebl* for procurement by th*
Federal Government under 41 US C. 4ft—
48c, 86 Stat 77. - :
. i certify that the following acQoa will v
not have a significant inspect on a "•• f
tubalamia I nrmsherr at small entities. Thar
major factor* conatdared were: ...•-•_
. a. The *ctloo will not result in any .'
additional reporting, recordkeeping or
.
.
other compliance requirement*, . .'
b. The action will not have a seriou*
economic impact on any contractor for
th* commodity listed. ' .
c Th* action will result in authorizing,
•mall etuitie* to produce a commodity
,
procured by th* Government
Accordingly, the following commodity
is hereby added to Procurement List
1984; '•.'•.:•...
cu-7216 '^?r^.'r"" •''."•:




|rt Da*, ft*- an PUa* n*~ftt fe«* .ml
aim* coo* saxe-ss-a
Handicapped. Crystal Square 5, Suite
1107, 175S leffarsoa Davis Highway.
Arlington. Virginia 22202.
FO« FUfTTrttX) INFORMATION CONTACT-.
C. W. Fletcher, (703) 557-1145.
sftjm^utNTARV iNFOnsaanosc Ttu*
notice is published pursuant to 41 U S.C
'7(a)(2), 85 Stat. 77 Its purpose IS to
prowda interested persons an
opportunity to *ubmit comments on the
poesibl* impact oi th* proposed action*.
II th* Committae approves the .
.
proposed addition*, all entitles of the
Federal Government will be required to
procure th* commodities and services
ilated below from workahop* for the
blind or other severely handicapped
It it proposed to add the following
coromoditie* and servicea to
Procurement list 1C&4, October 18. 1983
(46 FR 48415): i; :--- ••
OassUet —
Kit Deep Water Fording; 234O-0O-7W-O644
Clae*aai
Sllppera. Coav*l**omt Psnanl's. 6&32-0O-
07»-.'ssa &Mj-oo-ar9-79oz. uh-hhi^-
7904. 6S32-00>-241-62*a. 6632-00-079-7794
OataTH " " " ""**
Binder. Aw*rd Cartlncal*: 7S1 02-00-755-ran
.'*•.£
>,'
'Tha 1«\ ti ha* nol haen *d»u*icd 10 accotini lor
any ..-npana axponed twl«r« |»*. 1«r> ji 1904.
rYcH>o**>d Addltloo* to Prociiremavrt
Uat
su«n«A»iv. Th* Committee has received
proposals to add to Procurement List
1984 commodities to be produced by and
services to be provided by workshops
for the blind and other severely
handicapped
Comments Must Be Received on or
Before: February 22. 19S4.
ADOBES!: Committee for Pnrcha»e from










Ground* MaiBtenano*. Federal Center. 620 '
Cenrral AT*fl*a\ Alaxnada. Caofornl*
Croonda Mamtanaoca. US. Court of Appeala,
Tlh and Mission Street*. San Francisco,
Califarose ' •• ~-** «*•• '• -^










Office) of tt»*> StKTaAaVy
Draft Qutdanc* on Written Ouarantts***
iawMCr. OfSc* of th* Secretary, DOD.
ACTlOtC Notkst-. -.'* -,
sutstijLsrr. By this nouca. the
Department of Defens* seeks written
comments on proposed guidance to
Implement section 794 of the
Department of Defense Appropriations
Act 1984 IPtib. L 38-212). which
provides that no funds may be obligated
or expended for the procurement of a
weapon system unless the contractors
for such system provide certain written
guarantees to the United Stales The
proposed guidance provides specific
direction to heads of DOD Components
with respect to DOD policy and
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procedures, developed as a result of
Section 794. for requiring and obtaining
>uch guarantees at the weapon system
or Component level or both in
connection with the procurement of
weapon systems by the Department of
Defense.
DATES: Written comments must be
received by February 12. 19&4.
address: Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (Acquisition Management).
The Pentagon. Room 2A330. ,
Washington. D.C 20301.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT-.
Mr. Ron Buhner. (202) 89S-4235.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Development of guidance to meet the
statutory requirements of section 794
has required revision of. or tradeoffs
between * number of fundamental >
procurement policies. Our practice of
applying warranties when appropriate
in competitive firm fixed price typ«
contracts has been modified by the
statutory requirement to include
guarantees in all procurements that
qualify regardles* of whether ' »'-.
competitive or not and regardless of
contract type. Section 794 requires
acquisition of guarantees for weapon
systems which reverses long standing
DOD policy of using warranties
selectively at the subsystem and
Component level rather than the
systems level. - - ' ,« • '-:
Implementation of section 794. a copy
of which is reproduced below.-U •-
anticipated to require increased ?..
surveiUam* and enforcement of
guarantee provisions by contract
administration facilities both within the
government and within industry. Since
there will be significant assumption of
nsk by defense prime contractors as a
result of this statute, in all probability,
greater nska will have to be shared by
subcontractors and vendors.
Sec 791. la) Except at otherwise provided in thit section, none of
the funds appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated or
expended for the procurement of a weapon system unless the prime
contractor or other contractors for such system provides the United
States with written guarantees—
(1) that the system and each component thereof were designed
and manufactured so a* to conform to the Government i per- .
formanct requirements at specifically delineated (A) in the pro-
duction contract, or lB) in any other agreement relating to the
J, -. production of inch system entered into by the United States and
I',' '. the contractor; • '. T- - . -'' ~ >'-:•' • •'-" - *». i.t.-
-
'
ttj that the system and each component thereof, at the time
,..'
,
they are provided to the United States, are free from all defects
(in matenals and workmanship) which would cause the system
.,'";_.*» foil to conform to the Govenvnenttjterfarmance require-
.,
.' msnis at specifically delineated iA) in the production contract,
,
' or iB> in any other agreement relating to the production of such .
"!', system entered into by the Untied States and the contractor;
_> mnd v *•';.:.' •~< •)' •i .^J - ,.,* . „ e .),.• i -. • ..- r-1 ,,-,
y, Z'i.-lS) that, in the event of a failure of the weapon system or a
r
. component to meet the conditions specified in clauses (1) and
-
v , • Oh-
_
<„-•'»«—•...-.;• " O'' •': •*'•« '"' '*.•••" "?'•%*" T
-v-J\ \.£AJ the contractor will bear the cost of all work promptly
. „ .to repair or replace such parts at are necessary to achieve
,f ».".... the required performance requirements; or -.,
*"-".
...
.• (B) if the contractor foils to repair or replace such parts
---.




contractor will pay the costs incurred by the United Suites
in procuring such parts from another source,
(b) A utritten guarantee provided pursuant to subsection (a) shall
mot apply in the case of any weapon system or component thereof
'
whicn has been furnuhed by the Gooemment to a contractorf "~K "
.-. (cJ The Secretary of Defense may wan* the requirements of subsec-
tion (a) in the cote of weapon system if the Secretary—' ---•- -
.':. (1) determines that the waiver it necessary in the interest of
"*.5 the national defense or would not be cost effective; and 77
IS) notifies the Committees on Armed Services and Appropri-
ations of the Senate and the House of Representatives in writ-
ing of his intention to waive such requirements with respect to
such weapon system and includes in the notice an explanation
of the reasons for the waiver.
Id) The requirements for written guarantees provided in subsec
tion (a) hereof shall apply only to contracts whuzfi are awarded after
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Policy Guidance
Section 794 of the Department of
Defense Appropriation* Act, 1964
requires that written guaran'eea be
obtained in connection with the
procurement of weapon systems. This
guidance is issued to provide for
Implementation of section 794. It sets
forth the policy and procedures for
requiring and obtaining such guarantees







1. Definitions " >
v
- h
For purposes of this guidance:.
(a) "Weapon System " Is equipment
which, without substantial modification,
is or can be used directly by armed
forces to carry out combat missions. By
way of illustration, the term includes
bombers, fighter aircraft, attack
helicopters, combat naval vessels,
strategic and tactical missiles, tanks,
combat vehicles, small arms, torpedoes,
bombs and artillery. The term includes
software, ordnance, related support
equipment such as ground handling
equipment training devices, test
equipment and their accessone*.
(b) A "component" la an assembly or
any combination of parts. ,.;.;> . .
subassemblies, and assemblies mounted
together in manufacture, assembly,
maintenance, or rebuild. Spare parts, per
se. are not deemed component* unless
otherwise fitting this definition-^ J, ._-
,. (c) A "procurement" is a direct \-
contract between the government and a
.
contractor for the production of a.
weapon system and/or components ,. .
thereof, irrespective of contract type.
(d| A "specified performance _
,
requirement" Is any specifically
delineated mandatory performance
requirement set forth anywhere in a
government production contract for a
weapon system or in any other
agreement relating to the production of
such system incorporated or referenced
in such contract
(e) "Conform" means designed and
manufactured so as to meet or achieve,
or both, the government'* specified
performance requirement
(f) "Bear tha cost of means at no
Increase in contract price irrespective of
contract type. The written guarantees
set forth in a contract award for the
production of a weapon system shaU be
a separately priced firm fixed pnee line
item. .
(g) "At no cost to the government"
mean* that the cost* will not be
reimbursed the contractor directly or
Indirectly under the production contract
for the weapon system or any other
government contract (except for the firm
fixed price guarantee line item).
2. This guidance applies only to
contract awards made after March 14.
1984. •
For purposes of this guidance
(a) A modification to a contract to add
additional quantities constitute* a
contract award.
(b) The exercise of a priced
production option even when no further
definition or negotiation of terms ii
required constitutes a contract award.
(c) The notice to proceed with
quantities after the first year quantity In
• multi-year procurement does not
constitute a contract award. _ '" . •..
,
(d) The placement ofan order under •
basic agreement or basic ordering
agreement constitutes a contract award.
(e) The deEnittzation of an existing
redeterminable contract does not ' u
~
Constitute a new award. '
_
' (f) The definitization of.a letter
'contract constitutes a contract award.
-
.
i. Except to the extent otherwiae
provided herein, all government
contract* for the production of a weapon





(a) Guaranteeing that the weapon
system and each component thereof
were designed and manufactured so ••
to conform to the government'* specified
performance requirements and that at
the time of delivery to tha government
tha weapon system and each component
thereof are free from such defects in *
materials and workmanship a* would
cause tha system to fail to conform to
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the government s specified performance
requirements delineated in the contract.
(b) Guaranteeing that the contractor
•nil bear the cost o( all work promptly
to repair or replace such parts as are
necessary to achieve the nraired
performance requirements and
providing that if the contractor fails to
repair or replace part* promptly aj
required by the coatract the contractor
Will reimburse the government for any
coat incurred by the government in
procurjng audi part* from another
source — ....
. 4. A model clause that may be u»ed .
for thl« purpose in contract* for lea*
corapUx weapon systems is attached.
For complex systems, when different
types of requirements (see paragraph 5]
are present, special guarantee clauses
may be written, - . .
S. The written guarantees called for
herein pertaining to design and „, .
manufacture so a* to conform to the
government's ipecified performance
requirements will generally be of either
or both of two types:
(a) When the specified performance
reqrireroent(s) Is * test or demonstration
and the requirements!*) is deemed to be
satisfied upon the satisfactory
completion of the specified teal or
demonstration, for example, of a first
prototype or production urut the
guarantee »heQ prornle that, in the
event of a failure of a weapon, system or
component to complete satisfactorily the
specified teat or demon*tration. the
contractor shall perform prorapdy all
design and manufacture work as
necessary to conform to the
govemmemt* specified performance
reqoirements at no increase in contract
price and at no coat to the government
and to complete satisfactorily the
specified test or demonstration at no
increase In contract price.
(b) When the specified performance
requirement(s) consist* of the operation
of the system without designated
failures for a specified period or
Interval, the guarantee shall, at a
minimum, provide that, in the event of a
failure of a weapon system or
component thereof within the stipulated
penod to meet the designated
performance reouirementi*). the
contractor shall promptly, at no increase
In con trad price and at no cost to the
government perform all work to (1)
design and manufacture the system and
each component thereof so as to
conform to the government's specified
performance requirements as
specifically delineated and/or (2) repair
and/or replace such parts as necessary,
to meet the designated performance
requirement at no increase in contrart
price and at no cost to the government
8. In contracts fur weapon systems,
however, there are tivo types of
guarantee*. One for performance to
insure conformity of design and
manufacture to specifically delineated
performance requirements (as»et forth
above): and, one for freedom from oil
defects in materials and workmanship
which would cause the system not to
achieve the specified performance
requirement*. The latter 1* a separate
and distinct guarantee provision which
would attach to all delivered end items
under the weapon system contrad for a
specified p-nod of time. These
guarnrees are Dot mutually exclusive
and boti will be contained within a
•ingle contract for a weapon *ystem or
component* thereof.
7. Consistent with the policy itated in
DAH 1-124. the coatract may provide
liichadJ.Uonai warranty protection and
remedaes thereof a* may be deemed
appropriate by the government in the
circumstance*. -
8. The duration of the written
guarantee shall be tailored, as
appropriate, to the specific contract
•ward. The duration of the written
guaranlee(s) within any given contract
award need not be the same /or all
ipecified performance requi remenls.
9. Payment for the written guarantee
skail be made on a pro-rata basis at
time of delivery of the contract end
items co vered by the guarantee.
M. During negotiation of a proposed
contract care must be taken to identify
firm and/or presenbed performance
requirements that have been included in
the specification* and other relevant
document* in order to avoid later
dispute. These performance
requirement* snould be renewed to
assure that they are realistic and
achievable and that the performance
requirements specified in the contrad
accurately reflect the needs for the
weapon system. Unles* otherwise
Indicated by the government all
»pecified performance requirement* fall
under the performance guarantee(s). If it
should be determined that a written
guarantee at the weapon system level I*
not cost-effective or otherwise not in the
interest of the national defense, the
Identification and examination of
appropriate components of the weapon
system for applicability of a written
guarantee(s) is also required. This
examination should include a review of
Individual performance parameters
(such as durability) for application of a
written guarantee if comprehensive
coverage is determined to be infeasible.
11 During negoliabon of the contract
each eircumstance(i] that could have
the effect of voiding the guarantee
should be identified and specifically
delineated in the contract. For example,
if the guarantee would be voided, in
whole or in part, by the subsequent
incorporation of spare parts that were
not predetermined to be a duplicate of
the replaced part this should be the
subied of negotiation. Contracting
officers should not agree th8t any
circumstance(s) will void the guarantee
tmless the relationship between the
drc»mstance(3) and the performance
requirements is dired and the
circurastance(s) Identified as voiding the
warranty is beyond the control of and
not attributable to any fault of the
contractor. ""•"»•
12. The firm fixed price of the
guarantee(s) should be identified
teparatery. In order to facilitate the
identification of the cost of the
guarantee, it shall be set forth in the
conttad as a separate line item.
\a) rn determining whether use of a
guarantee is cost effective to the
government the benefits to be derived
from the guarantee must be related to
the costs of the guarantee to the
government Guarantee costs arise from
the contractor's charge for accepting the
deferred liability created by the
guarantee and from the government'*
administration and enforcement of the
guarantee fn most cases, contractors
will quote a higher price to provide the
guarantee. Competition will be a major
factor in the price quoted by the
contractor to the governmmt for the
guarantee. In addition, the experience of
the contractor in producing the item is
another major factor in the cost of the
guarantee since it may rely on an
actuarial basis to assess financial risk.
As a further consideration, the
estimated cost to the government for
correction or replacement by the
contractor, by another source, or by the
government in the absence of a
guarantee, should be compared to the
guarantee cost* considered above.
(b) There are other factors which must
be considered in determining whether
the guarantee is cost effective such as
any indirect costs to the Government
necessary to maintain the guarantee in
effect. For example, if certain spare
part* must be purchased only from
designated suppliers in order to keep the
guarantee in effed. the estimate of the
loss to the government attributable to
this limitation on competition should ba
estimated. By way of a second example,
the effect on breakout and competitive
procurement of weapon system
component* ahould be considered.
13. The waiver authority granted in
Subsection 794(c) is hereby delegated to
the Secretaries of the Array. Navy, and
Air Force and to the Directors of
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2506 Federal Register / Vol. 49. No. 14 / Friday, Iar.uary 20. 1904 / Notices
Defense Agpncies with authority to
redelegate not below the level of the
Vice or Assistant Commander of a
Major Command or the Assistant
Director of a Defense Agency. Class
waivers for specific programs may be
granted, when lustitied. Class waivers
may not be approved below the level of
the Assistant Secretary of the Military
Department or the Director of a Defense
Agency. A written record will be kept oX
each waiver grafted, together with
supporting documentation, to meet the
reporting requirements to the Congress.
A waiver of the guarantee requirements
in whole or in part set forth above must
be:
(a) Supported by a written
determination that the waiver is
necessary in the interest of the national
defense or would not be cost-effective.
(b) An intention to waiver such
requirements must be forwarded to the
committees on Armed Services and
Appropriations of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in writing,
including in the notice an explanation of
the reasons for the waiverfs).
(1) Notification of all class waivers
will be sent to the DoD Acquisition
Executive. w .. .«,.-. .. -
14. This guidance is effective .. . . ,-
immediately. - . • . v
Guarantee * ' ' ' '
,
*
(») Notwithstanding inspection and
acceptance by the government of lupcilie* !
furnishes under Oil* contract or any provision
of this contract concerning the . •*
conclusiveness thereof, tha contractor
guarantees:
(1 1 That tine item and each component
thereof are designed and manufactured so as
to confirm to the performance requirements
of this contrail end all other supplementary
agreements relating to the producuon under
this contract of line item entered into by
thai United States and the contractor, and
(2) Thai line item and each component
thereof, at the dm* of delivery, are free from
all defects In material* and workmanship
which would cause tha line item to fad to
conform to the performance requirements of
this contract and all other supplementary
agreements relanng to the production under
this contract of line Item entered into by
the United Stales and the contractor!
provided, however, that with respect to
government- furnished property the
contractor's guarantee shad extend only to its
proper installation so as not to degrade its
performance and/or reliability, unless the
contractor performs some modificauons or
other work on such property. In which case
the contractor' warranty shall extend to
such modification or other work.
(b| In the event of a failure of line item
to meet tha conditions specified in
subparagraphs (d)(1) or falU) above:
(1) The contractor will promptly repair or
replace such parts at are necessary to
achieve the required performance
requirements and the contractor shall bear all
costs in connection therewith, or
(2) If the contractor fails to repair or
replace such parts promptly, as determined
by the contracting officer, the contrsctor will
pay the costs incurred by the government In
procuring such parts from another source and
in accomplishing the repair.
(c) The contractor will also prepare and
furnish to the government data and reports
applicable to any correction required under
this clause (including revision and updating
of ad affected data called for under this
contract) at no increase in contract price or
coat to tha government,
(d) When items covered under lha
guarantee are returned to the contractor. In
pursuance to this clause, (he contractor will
bear the transportation costs from the placet
of delivery specified in the contract
(Irrespectiv e of lha fob. point or point of
acceptance) to the contractor's plant and
return.
(e) If the government determines that it
does nut require repair or replacement of
defeenve or nonconforming supplies, the
government shall be entitled to an equitable
adpistment in the pnee of such supplies.
{0 The contractor shall be notified in
writing of any failure of line item or any
component thereof subiect to the guarantee
set forth in paragraph (a| above within
da>s after mscovery of the failure. Upon
election by the government of a remedy in
accordance with paragraph (b) or (c) above,
the contractor wilL notwithstanding any
disagreement regarding the guarantee,
comply with such direction. In the event it ia
later determined that the fadure was not
subiect to die guarantee set forth in
paragraph (a| above, the contract pnee will
be equitably adjusted.
. ,
(g) The guarantee provisions of this clause
do not apply to combat damage.
(h| For purposes of this clause, the term
"performance requirements" means only
those performance characterises that are
mandatory. Tha term "performance
requirement* " does not include performance
characteristics that are described aa goals or
obiecdves.
(i) The rights and remedies of tha
Government provided in this clause are In
addition to. and do not limit, any rights the
government may have under any other clause
of lha contract. Disputes ansing under this
clause will be resolved In accordance with
the clause of this contract ennded Disputes.
Dated: |.inuary 17. 1964.
M. S. Healy.
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer.
Deportment of Defense.
frs Dno M-ioa Fn*a i_i*-m a«a «mt
tuxim coot ssio-oi
Department of The) Air Force
Intent To Prepare a Oraft
Environmental impact Statement (EIS)
The National Cuard Bureau proposes
to relocate the 146 Tactical Airlift Wing
with its 16 C-l JOE's from Van Nuys
Airport to NAS Pt Mugu. CA.
Wtlh 500 general aviation aircraft
based ul Van Nuys and over a half
million annual operations, air traffic and
flying safely are primary reasons for the
move. The 146 TAW already
accomplishes its traific pattern and
instrument training at other airfields
having fewer aircraft movements. The
14d TAW is currently limited to initial
takeoff and full stop landing at Van
Nuys.
The National Cuard Bureau has
completed a preliminary survey for
candidate sites. Two alternate location
sites are Norton AFB San Bernardino
County and Air Force Plant No. 42.
Palmdale. Los Angeles County There
will be no change in the number of
military and civilian personnel
employed.
The enviommenlal analysis will cover
such topics as pnme and unique
farmlands, floodplains. wedands. noise.
air quality, water quality btotic
communities, compatible land use, and
socioeconomic Impact
Participation in the environmental
analysis process by interested federal.
state, and local agencies, as well as
Interested private organizations nod
Individuals, is invited. Public meetings
will be held in early March 1964 to
review the proposed action and
facilitate public involvement in the
environmental analysis. Exa<:t time and
place of meetings will be announced in
the local new media. • .
.
It Is estimated tha draft EIS will be
available for public review and
comment in August 1964. Questions
concerning the proposal, public
meettngls) and EIS may be directed to
Mr. Don Williams. AMCSC/DEV.
Andrews AFB. MD 20331, [301) 961-6693.
Winmbei F Holme*
Air Force Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[TV iVjt H.IM] FltoJ l-19-a* *4S tori
ssujMa coot me-ai-e
Oeoartment of the Army, Corps of
Engineers
Intent To Prepare a Draft
Environmental Impact Statement
(DEIS) for Department of the Army
Permit To Construct a Peat Processing
Plant In Milfovrd and Bradley, Maine
agency: Army Corps of Engineers.
DOD. New England Division.
actioh: Notice of intent to prepare a
draft environmental impact statement.
Summary: l. The New England Division
of the Corps of Engineers will be
reviewing an application »o be made by
Signal Cleaniueis. Inc. ol Hampton. New
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APPENDIX
FYS 5 DEFENSE AUTHOR! Z AT
3D??n
1 reco-nentet quantity.''.
2 (b) I K.e amendment - is by sucsecticn (5) shall ta< =
3 effact at tne end of tne 183-aay perioc oagir.hing on :ne cate
u of the ^enactment of this Act.
5 Additional "iscellanaous Procurement Provisions
5 Sao. 123«. (a) Chapter 1U1 of title 13, United States
7 code, is 'Tended by adding at the end thereof the following
3 law sections:
?
,% S2U32. Prohibition of contractors Uniting subcontractor
12 sales directly to the United States
Ti "(a) Eecn contract for the purchase of supplies or
12 services -aoe oy tr.e ceparfne.nt of Defense shall provide that
13 the ro-trector will nct--
iu , ''(1) enter into any agreement with a suocontractor
' 5 _no = r tne contract that nas tne effect of unreasonably
15 restricting sales oy tne suocontractor airectiy to tne
i"7 United States of any ite~ or crocess (including co-outsr
is software) -ade or furnished by tne subcontractor under
-
1 « tha contract (or any follow-on production contract); or
2: *'(2) otherwise act to restrict unreascnaciy the
2i aoility of a suocontractor to naK.e sales to tne united
22 States described in clause (1).
23 *'(o) mis sactio.n toes not prc.mcit a contractor fro?.
2 u asserting rights it otherwise has - n d e r 1 a ••"
.









' ' (i) : n this section:
* * ( 1 )
'
'«' e a p o n system.' means i t em s t h at e a " c e .se:
aireczl'/ cy tne armeo forces to carry sat cor.eat missions
and that cost more than S1?2,323 cc for which the
eventual total procurement cost is more than si2 ,233 ,333 .
Such term dees not include commercial items sold in
substantial quantities to tne general public.
*'(2) 'Prima contractor' means a party that enters
into an acree^ent cirectiy with the United States to
furnisn part :r all of a weapon system .
' *(2) *:esirn and ma.nuf act^n-.c requir ene.-.ts ' means
structural ait snsineerinj pians anc manufacturing
particulars, i.nciuoinc precise measure-ants, tolerances,
system tain; produced.
'
'(tj 'Essential performance requirements ' , with
raspert to a weapon system, means the operating
capacilities or .maintenance anc reliability
cmar aoteristics of tna system that are ceterminec py tne
Secretary of Defense to oe necessary for the system to
fulfill trie nUltary requirement for which the system is
desicned .
" '(5) "Temper, ant' means amy constituent element c: a
•j a a po n system.
" * ( 5 ) * u a t u r e tjil-scaia procuctirn' n e a n s tne
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manuf actuce of all units of a -eaoon svsts- after the
manufacture of the first one-tenth of tne eventual total
production or trie initial pcocuctlon quantity of such
systsm, whicnsvec is less.
*
%, (7) 'initial production quantity' aisans the nuaioer
of units of a weaoon system contracted for in the first
yaar of full-scale production.
*'(?) % Head of an agency' nas the -ea.ning given that
tern in section 2 3 e2 of this title.
**(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the
at of a~ agency ".ay net after January 1, 19S5, enter into a
"tract for t.ne production of a weapon system unless eacn
i-e contractor for the system provides the '.'niter States
t.n written guarantees tr.at--
' *(i) tne List, providec uncer the contract will
confer.?, to the design and -anuf acturinc requirements
soeoificaiiy oeii.neatea in tne production contract (o: in
any amendment to that contract);
"'(2) tie iter, provioed uncer the contract, at tne
t i ni a it is oeiivered to the United States, will c e free
from all defects in materials anc vorKmanshlp
;
'
'(3) the item provided uncer the contract will
co-form to tne essential performance requirene-ts of the
iter, as specifically delineated in the production









'*U) if zr.s i-3.Ti provioer jr.cer the contract fa. Is
to T.eet tne cuarar.tee specif iec in clause (1), (2), cr
C2), the contractor will at tne election Pi tne secretary
of Defense or as otherwise provided in the contract--
* * *(A) promptly take such corrective action as may
oa necessary to correct tne failure at no additional
cost to tne United States; or
v,
( = ) pay costs raasonaoly l.nrurrec oy tr.e Jnitea
States in ta^i.n; such corrective action.
'"(c) rr.a head of the aje.ncy concerned say not require
weapon system, cr fcr a component of a weapon system, that is
**(d) Subject tc subsection Ce)(D, the Secretary of
!>ef=r. sa z ay waive part or ail of sue sect ion (o) in tne case
of a weapon syste-i, or component of a weapon syster, if tne
Secretary ceter:.l.nes--
' *(1) tnat tne waiver is necessary in the interest of
national defense; cr
'"(2) tnat a juarantae uncer tnat subsection would
not o e cost-effective.
Tne secretary "nay not cele^ate autnority under tnis
subsection to any person wno nolcs a position below tne level












"(:)(D Before nafcl.ng 2 waiver uncer sutseot.en r-) ,:-p.
respeet to a weapon systen that is a .ma^or defer.se
acquisition program foe tns purpose of section 139a of cnis
title, tie Secretary cf Defense shall notify the "orr.mittees
en ArtieM Services and en Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Reprasa.ntativss in writing of his intention to waive
any or ail of the requirements of subsection (2) with respect
to that syste.-n and snail include in the notice an explanation
of tne reasons for the waiver.
*
'(2) sot later than February 1 of each year, the
Secretary of Defsnse snail suo~.it to the coarrittees specified
in paragraph (1) a report identifying each waiver -ade under
sjoseotion (a) during tne prereomg caienoar year for a
weapon system that is not a c.aior defense acquisition erocrarr
for the p-irpcse cf section 139a of tr.is title ant shall
i-.cluda in the report an explanation of the reaso-.s for the
waivers.
'"(f) Tne rec-ire.~e.nt for a guarantee mdar suoseoticn
(b)(3) applies only in the case of a contract for a ^a::r.
systen tiat is in -aiure full-scale production. Kowaver,
nothing in this section prohibits the head of the agency
concerned from negotiating a guarantee similar to tne
guarantee described in tnat subsection for a weapon system
not yet in nature full-scale production, ^-.en a ocntract for
a weaoon system net yet m .mature full-scale production is
no
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! "* e '~^ ~ u ^ ci!3r3"^t n s i^s-ribi"4 I. n suissct ' ^^
2- (o) (2) tie secretary snail comply wltn the notice
3 requirements of sudsecticn (e).
u
*
'(g) Noting in tnls sectioi pcoiioits tie need of tie
5 agency concerned from--
5 '*M) negotiating tie specific details of a
7 guarantee, including reasonable exclusions, limitations
S aid time duration, sc lone as tie negotiated guarantee is
3 consistent «"itn tie general requirements of tMs section;
i? ''(2) requiring t.-.at components of a ^za^c. syste-
12 properly installed so as not to in validate any warranty
13 or guarantee nrovioao oy tna nanuiacturer of 3. on
Vj cor.poieit to the 'Jr.iteo States;
15 "'(3) racucing tie price of any contract foe a weapon
15 system or otner defense equipment to ta*.e account of any
17 payment due ::c a contractor pursuant to subclause (?)
*5 of suosectio.n (c)(2);
1 5 '"(ft) in tie case of a dual source procurement,
12 exe noting fro?, tie requirements of suosection (o)(i) an
21 arount of production oy t.ne second source contractor
22 equivalent to tie first one-tentn of tie eventual total
23 production oy tie secono source contractor; and
2u ,% (5) usiic written guarantees to a greater extent
25 tian required by tlis section. Including guarantees tlat
111
0OD??.D
1 exceed Chose In clauses M), (2), an1 (3) of sudsecticr.
2 (o) and guarantees that provide -ore co-npre.ne.-.sive




* (h)(1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such
6 regulations as may de necessary to carry out this section.
7 "(2) This section does not apply to the roast Guard or
9 tc the National Aeronautics and Space '.d.Tunistr ation .
5 ''S2U3U. acquisition of petroleum: authority to waive
iz contract procedures
11 * "(a) ine secretary of Defense ray, for any purchase of
'2 petroleum, waive the application of any prevision of law
13 prescnoii; procedures to ce follower in t.ns iteration of
iu contracts, prescrioi.ng terxs and conditions tc de included in
15 contracts, or regulating tns rarior-ar.ee of contracts if tr.e
i
-: Secretary cetemi.nes--
17 *'(i) that petroleum mar.Ket conditions n = v= adversely
18 affecteo (or will m tne near future acverseiy affect)
1? tne acquisition of petroleuT ry tne ?epert _ e-.t of
2 2 Defense; ana
21 *'(2) tne waiver will expedite or facilitate tne
22 acquisition of petrolaun for Government laeos.
23 **(b) K waiver under sudsectlor. (a) may De nace '-'itn
2- respect to a particular contract or with respect to ciasses
25 of contracts. Sucn a waiver that is apolioeoie tc a contract
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